USAFFE Order

My grandfather Teddy and my great grandmother Maria returned to Caloocan city after the vacation at Lubao, Pampanga. He was hired and worked as a clerk at Philippine National RailRoads(Now Philippine National Railways), before the second world war. My great grandmother Maria invested in a small business outside their house, she was selling different Filipino delicacies for "Almusal"(Breakfast) and "Merienda"(Snack). They get married in the following year, in the summer of 1941 at Binondo Church in Manila. My grandfather and my grandmother Antonia, her sister, my grandmother's youngest sister lived together with my great grandmother Maria with a simple but joyful life in Caloocan City until the unexpected nightmare for the country comes a few months later. On 25th of July 1941, US Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson requested that US President Franklin D. Roosevelt issue orders calling the military forces of the Philippines into active service for the United States. The following day President Roosevelt froze all Japanese assets within the United States and issued orders to absorb the forces of the Philippine Army. That same day he created the command, with jurisdiction over them and the military forces of the Commonwealth. At the same time, General Douglas MacArthur was recalled to active duty and designated the commander of USAFFE(United States Army Forces in the Far East), a group of combined Filipino-American forces. But this new military order was not that easy to be granted by the Commonwealth and the United States, there were stories behind the absorption of the Philippine Army. The establishment of a new American command in the Far East and the recall of General MacArthur to active duty in the U.S. Army was already under consideration when Japan moved southward in July 1941. A month earlier Joseph Stevenot, a prominent American businessman in Manila and president of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, in an interview with Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson in Washington, had urged a closer relationship between the Military Advisor and the commander of the Philippine Department. Stimson had relayed this suggestion to General Marshall at a meeting during which both men discussed Mac Arthur's status and agreed he was the logical man to command in the Far East in the event of an emergency. By a coincidence, on the same day that Stimson talked with Stevenot, Maj. Gen. George Grunert, the Philippine Department commander, asked permission from the War Department to include representatives of the Commonwealth Government in conferences then being held in Manila. The purpose of these meetings was to formulate plans, based on the expected use of $52,000,000 in sugar excise funds, for improving the defenses of the Islands. The reason for Grunert's request was to permit him to work more closely and directly with General MacArthur without going through official government channels. Close contact between the department commander and the Military Advisor, he pointed out, was an obvious necessity in making defense plans. General Marshall approved Grunert's request without question, adding that "MacArthur's support will be invaluable to you in the accomplishment of the difficult task with which you are confronted." The first direct bid for the recall of General MacArthur came from the former Chief of Staff himself and was contained in a letter to General Marshall.

In this letter, MacArthur stated that since the Philippine Army was to be absorbed by the U.S. Army in the near future-a step not yet contemplated by the War Department-he intended to close out the office of Military Advisor. A new American military command embracing all U.S. Army activities in the Far East, comparable to the British command in that area, should be established, he told the Chief of Staff, and he, MacArthur, be named commander. The idea of creating a high command in the Far East had been broached before, but never by so influential a source. In January 1941 the intelligence officer of the Philippine Department had recommended to his superiors in Washington that such a command be established. This proposal differed from MacArthur's in that the department commander was to be designated commander in chief of such a command, while MacArthur put forward his own nomination. The Philippine Department G-2 continued to urge this move during the first six months of 1941, but there is no evidence that it was ever considered by the General Staff in Washington until June of that year, after General MacArthur's letter to the Chief of Staff. MacArthur's proposal was sent to the War Plans Division of the General Staff for study. On 6 June Brig. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, acting chief of the division, sent his recommendations to the Chief of Staff. He agreed that the British had created such a command, but pointed out that their situation was quite different from that faced by the Americans. The British had accepted the strategic direction of naval forces in the Far East, and their troops were scattered throughout the area. U.S. Army forces were concentrated in the Philippines and had responsibility only for the defense of the Islands. Gerow, therefore, recommended against the establishment of a new command in the Far East. If MacArthur was called to active service, he wrote, it should be as commander of the Philippine Department. Despite the recommendations of the chief of War Plans, the official reply to MacArthur's letter expressed a sentiment entirely favorable to the proposal. This reply was contained in a letter dated 20 June from the Chief of Staff to General MacArthur. In it, Marshall told the Military Advisor that the War Department's plans for the Philippine Army were not as broad as MacArthur believed, but that the decision to close out his office rested with him. All that the U.S. Army planned to do at the present time, he said, was to train about 75,000 Filipinos for a period of from three to nine months, contingent upon the appropriation by Congress of the sugar excise and currency devaluation fund.

"Both the Secretary of War and I [Marshall continued] are much concerned about the situation in the Far East. During one of our discussions about three months ago, it was decided that your outstanding qualifications and vast experience in the Philippines make you the logical selection for the Army Commander in the Far East should the situation approach a crisis. The Secretary has delayed recommending your appointment as he does not feel the time has arrived for such action. However, he has authorized me to tell you that, at the proper time, he will recommend to the President that you be so appointed. It is my impression that the President will approve his recommendation."

The appointment of General MacArthur as commander of all Army forces in the Far East was part of the larger problem of mobilization and training of the Philippine Army. By July 1941 it was clear that some decision on the use of the Philippine Army would soon have to be made. On 7 July MacArthur presented his views on the mobilization and training of the Philippine Army in a personal letter to the Chief of Staff, adding that the creation of high command for the Far East "would result in favorable psychological and moral reactions." A week later General Gerow summarized for the Chief of Staff the steps being taken for improving the defenses of the Philippine Islands, and on 17 July made the following specific recommendations:

1. That the President, by executive order, call into the service of the U.S. for the period of the emergency all organized military forces of the Commonwealth.

2. That General MacArthur is called to active duty in the grade of Major General and assigned as commander of Army Forces in the Far East.

3. That $10,000,000 of the President's Emergency Fund be allotted to cover the costs of mobilization and training of the Philippine Army for a period of three months.

4. That the training program of the Philippine Army for an additional six to nine months be financed from the sugar excise fund, or from other funds appropriated for this purpose.

5. That 425 Reserve officers be sent to the Philippines to assist in the mobilization and training of the Philippine Army.

Within a week these recommendations had been approved by the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War. The Secretary immediately requested President Franklin D. Roosevelt to issue the necessary executive order, already drafted and approved, for calling the military forces of the Commonwealth into active service of the United States. "Due to the situation in the Far East," Stimson wrote, "all practical steps should be taken to increase the defensive strength of the Philippines Islands." One of the most effective measures to accomplish this would be to call the Philippine Army into active service for a year's training. Such a program, Stimson estimated, would involve about 75,000 men and would cost about $32,000,000, which would be met by the sugar excise fund. Pending appropriation by Congress, the funds to initiate the program could be met from the President's emergency fund. Stimson's recommendations reached the President at a time when he was thoroughly aroused by Japan's occupation of air and naval bases in Indochina on July 22nd. Already he had broken off negotiations with Japan for a settlement of Far Eastern problems and was considering economic reprisals in the form of a freeze on Japanese assets in the United States. On the 26th of July, the day after Stimson made his recommendations, the President put the freeze into effect and issued the military order which would bring into the service of the United States the armed forces of the Philippines. The President's military order did not mention General MacArthur by name; it was carefully worded so as to place the forces in the Philippines under a general officer of the United States Army, "to be designated by the Secretary of War from time to time." The actual induction of Philippine Army units was to be accomplished by orders issued by that general officer. The War Department immediately followed up the President's action by establishing, that same day, a new command in the Philippines, with headquarters in Manila. This command, to be called U.S. Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), would consist of the Philippine Department, those military forces of the Commonwealth ordered into active service for the period of the emergency, and such other forces as might be assigned. At the same time, MacArthur was recalled to active duty, effective on 26 July, with the rank of Major General, designated as the general officer referred to in the military order, and put in command of U.S. Army Forces in the Far East. With the establishment of USAFFE and the simultaneous induction of the military forces of the Commonwealth Government, the two separate military establishments which had existed in the Philippine Islands since 1935 were be placed soon for the first time under one command a few months later in 1941.

The integration of the armed forces of the Philippine Commonwealth into the service of the United States was to be gradual. Elements of the ten reserve divisions were to be called into service at regular intervals until 15 December 1941, when the mobilization would be complete. The Philippine Army Air Corps would be inducted separately. Reserve units engaged in their normal yearly training were not to be inducted unless war came. It was hoped in this way to continue the development of the Commonwealth's defense program and at the same time mobilize and train the Philippine Army. Commonwealth forces coming under United States control would retain their national integrity; they would have their own uniforms, rations, military law, the scale of pay, and promotion list; would requisition through their own supply channel until December 1st, but would be paid by the U. S. Army. The Regular Army of the Philippine Commonwealth and the Constabulary were not to be inducted immediately. A construction program was to be started immediately since there was only enough housing for about one-third of the 75,000 men scheduled for induction. Campsites would have to be selected and facilities for training built. The first units called would use existing or temporary quarters and, as camps were completed, additional units would be inducted. By 15 December, when the last units would be mobilized, the entire construction program would be completed. On 15 August, less than three weeks after he had assumed command of USAFFE, General MacArthur incorporated into the American forces the Philippine Army Air Corps of six squadrons and approximately 500 men. A few days later he issued orders calling into the service by 1 September ten infantry regiments-one from each of the reserve divisions-and the cadres of most of the other divisional units. Coast artillery schools were established at Fort Mills (Corregidor) and Fort Wint (Grande Island), and field artillery cadres were trained at the Philippine Army training center at Camp Dau, near Fort Stotsenburg. Two engineer schools were established, with instructors from the 14th Engineer Regiment (PS), the engineer component of the Philippine Division. A signal and a medical school were organized at Fort William McKinley; a second medical school was established for the training of nondivisional cadres, and in the port area of Manila was a quartermaster motor transport school.