Flight 32

You are already close to experimental the end of this book that is supernaturally rare for some for others it is just myths and stories

Welcome to Qantas Flight 32 today is November 2010 right now it's 11:45 (whenever you're on a plane you don't feel like thinking the plane is going to crash or you feel very scared, in this case you don't know if it's a myth or really happened). Have you ever heard of this story? And if you heard about this, do you know what happened? or do you have any ideas, theories, etc.? Right now I am selling to give you some information that will make you think a lot about these aviation problems.

These are the possible causes of the accident; 1. Disc failure during the occurrence flight

- Over time, a fatigue crack had developed in the thin-wall section of the oil feed stub pipe in the No. 2 engine to the extent that, during the occurrence flight, opening of the crack through normal movement within the engine released oil into the HP/IP buffer space.

- Auto-ignition of the oil leaking from the oil feed stub pipe created an intense and sustained fire within the HP/IP buffer space that resulted in localized heat damage to the intermediate pressure (IP) turbine disc.

- The IP turbine disc separated from the drive arm and accelerated.

- Following the separation of the IP turbine disc from the drive arm, the engine behaved in a manner that differed from the engine manufacturer's modeling and experience with other engines in the Trent family, with the result that the IP turbine disc accelerated to a rotational speed in excess of its design capacity whereupon it burst in a hazardous manner. [Safety issue]

2. Manufacture and release into service of engine serial number 91045

- During the manufacture of the HP/IP bearing support assembly fitted to the No. 2 engine (serial number 91045), movement of the hub during the machining processes resulted in a critically reduced wall thickness within the counter bore region of the oil feed stub pipe.

- It was probable that a non-conformance in the location of the oil feed stub pipe interference bore was reported by the coordinate measuring machine during the manufacturing process, but that the non-conformance was either not detected or not declared by insp

ection personnel, resulting in the assembly being released into service with a reduced wall thickness in the oil feed stub pipe.

3. Opportunity to manage the non-conforming oil feed stub pipes in the Trent 900 fleet

- The statistical analysis used to estimate maximum likely oil feed stub pipe counter bore misalignment, and resulting thin wall section, did not adequately represent the population of actual misalignments in engines already released into service, nor did it implicitly provide a level of uncertainty in the results.

- The language used to define the size of the non-conformance on the retrospective concession form did not effectively communicate the uncertainty of the statistical analysis to those assessing and approving the concession.

- The engine manufacturer did not have a requirement for an expert review of statistical analyses used in retrospective concession applications. [Safety issue]

- The engine manufacturer's process for retrospective concessions did not specify when in the process the Chief Engineer and Business Quality Director approvals were to be obtained. Having them as the final approval in the process resulted in an increased probability that the fleet-wide risk assessment would not occur. [Safety issue]

- The retrospective concession was not approved by the Chief Engineer and Business Quality Director, as required by the group quality procedures relating to retrospective concessions, denying them the opportunity to assess the risk to the in-service fleet.

What do you think about this case thanks to our friends from The Aviation Safety Network who were able to collect clues and more or less create theories about the possible causes of the accident, what do you think? Is it real or a legend for you? what do you think? Thanks to The Aviation Safety Network we know more about this case. For more details visit The Aviation Safety Network there you can find a little more about these cases.