Free Will (6)

In the debate over free will, some argue that determinism is compatible with free will while others maintain that it is incompatible. Those who believe that determinism is compatible with free will, known as compatibilists, argue that freedom can be present or absent in a situation for reasons unrelated to metaphysics. They believe that the concept of free will is separate from metaphysical issues and can be understood in terms of the choices that individuals are able to make within the constraints of their environment. In contrast, those who argue that determinism is incompatible with free will, known as incompatibilists, believe that free will requires the existence of some kind of metaphysical freedom that is beyond the constraints of the physical world.

There are various approaches to compatibilism, including explanations that focus on the internal causality of the mind in relation to higher-order brain processing, the role of agency in the formation of character, and the idea that free will is a product of our natural sense of agency and the development of a theory of mind. Incompatibilists, on the other hand, argue that we may simply be automata responding in predictable ways to stimuli in our environment, and that all of our actions are controlled by external forces or random chance.

In the debate surrounding the concept of free will, two main viewpoints often emerge: compatibilism and incompatibilism. The former argues that free will and determinism, the idea that everything that happens is predetermined, are not mutually exclusive. Incompatibilism, on the other hand, asserts that free will and determinism cannot coexist. The literature on this subject tends to overlook the distinction between physical determinism and higher level forms of determinism, such as predeterminism and theological determinism. This lack of distinction can lead to confusion when trying to classify certain beliefs as either compatibilist or incompatibilist. For example, hard determinism with respect to theological determinism might be considered hard incompatibilism with respect to physical determinism, or even compatibilism, depending on the assumptions made about the causality and determinism of the universe and the necessity of determinism for free will. Similarly, metaphysical libertarianism, a form of incompatibilism with respect to physical determinism, could be classified as compatibilism with respect to theological determinism if it is assumed that free will events are pre-ordained but not predetermined by God. However, if hard theological determinism is accepted and it is believed that outcomes are predetermined by God, then metaphysical libertarianism is not possible and would need to be reclassified as hard incompatibilism or hard determinism.

The idea of free will is a fundamental aspect of the mind-body problem, or the consideration of the relationship between the mind (such as consciousness, memory, and judgment) and the body (including the brain and nervous system). Philosophers have proposed various models of the mind that can be divided into physical and non-physical explanations. Dualism, the belief that the mind is a non-physical substance separate from the body, suggests that the mind and body interact but maintain some level of autonomy. Physicalism, on the other hand, holds that everything that exists is no more than its physical properties, meaning there are no non-physical substances such as the mind. Some physicalist theories, such as property dualism, suggest that mental properties form a separate ontological class from physical properties, while others, like anomalous monism, argue that mental events arise from physical events. The question of free will is closely tied to the concept of determinism, or the belief that all events are ultimately predetermined. Compatibilism asserts that determinism is compatible with free will, while incompatibilism argues that they are incompatible. The debate over free will and determinism continues to be a central topic in philosophy.

Many philosophers and scientists believe that free will is an illusion. According to Baruch Spinoza, "men believe themselves free, simply because they are conscious of their actions, and unconscious of the causes whereby those actions are determined." David Hume also suggested that the entire debate about free will may be nothing more than a "verbal" issue, arising from a "false sensation or seeming experience" associated with our actions. Arthur Schopenhauer argued that while the will, as the underlying noumenon of the phenomenal world, is free and not subject to causality, the individual, as a phenomenon of the will, is determined and subject to necessity. In his book "Free Will," neuroscientist Sam Harris asserts that free will is an illusion and that thoughts and intentions are the result of causes beyond our awareness and control.

Compatibilism is the belief that free will is compatible with determinism, the idea that every event is caused by a chain of prior events. This means that while the choices we make may be determined by previous events and circumstances, we still experience them as free and voluntary. Some proponents of compatibilism argue that free will is a matter of acting according to one's determined motives and desires, while others see it as the ability to choose within the constraints of our circumstances. Some philosophers, such as Harry Frankfurt and Daniel Dennett, argue that free will is simply the freedom to choose within the limits of what we are able to do. Others, like Thomas Hobbes, define free will as the ability to act on one's desires as long as it is possible to do otherwise. Compatibilism is often connected with physicalist approaches to studying the mind, such as cognitive naturalism, which sees the mind as a part of nature that can be studied through empirical methods. Non-naturalist compatibilism, on the other hand, posits the existence of a soul or mind separate from the body that is able to perceive, think, and act freely. Some philosophers, such as Ted Honderich, argue that the debate over free will is fundamentally a verbal issue, while others, like Sam Harris, argue that free will is an illusion. Others, like Rudolf Steiner, see free will as a combination of inner freedom, or the integration of sensory impressions and thoughts, and outer freedom, or the ability to envision and act on moral ideals.