It Could Have Been Worse: An SI into Conrad von Hotzendorf by alpahsierra

Link: https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/it-could-have-been-worse-an-si-into-conrad-von-hotzendorf.509407/

Prologue

Stumbling to War: A History of the First World War and the Men Who Made It

Chapter 5: Austria-Hungary

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When talking about the principal actors in the prelude to war, every combatant nation has their political-military pair. For England it is David Lloyd George and Douglas Haig; for Germany, Wilhelm II and Von Falkenhayn; Clemenceau and Joffre for France, the list continues. But for all of these men none stand out as much as Franz Conrad von Hotzendorf.

The best way to describe Hotzendorf is visionary. Of him, Falkenhayn said, "He is that uncommon genius who sees too far ahead." Commanders both during the First World War and in the wars that followed unequivocally credited him with the development of many of the tactics that are used today: fire and maneuver, small unit organization, artillery spotting by aircraft, and the assigning of weapon assets below the divisional level. It is no exaggeration to say that without Conrad, Austria-Hungary was destined for a slow decay until ethnic tensions inside the empire tore it apart. Appointed Chief of Staff in 1900, Hotzendorf embarked on an ambitious modernization program for the entire Austro-Hungarian military; unlike previous attempts this modernization was not limited to the Common Army, the Honved and the Landwehr were both included. This practice of incessant improvements, both great and small, would continue for the entirety of his 40-year tenure, during which he would oversee multiple revolutions in military affairs, as well as modernizations in the governmental and political aspects of warfighting.

Despite his apparently unstoppable energy and drive to make the K.u.K. Armee a modern fighting force, Conrad was not without his faults. Oftentimes, his reach would exceed his grasp, leaving his proposed alterations to be gutted by the political realities of the peacetime Reichsrat and Országgyűlés. Conrad was so certain that his view of the future was the correct one, that he often fell into deep melancholy over the blindness of his fellows in the Empire and their unwillingness to see the threat before them. Today we would diagnose him with severe depression, bordering on suicidal at times. It is, indeed, a wonder that he never even attempted suicide, by any method, given the depths to which he could descend, as evidenced by his personal journals and the writings of his multiple aide-de-camps. In his journals, a hobby he adopted at 19, he would continually vent his frustrations with the Hungarian parliament and their insularity, using the phrase, "die nie genug verdammten Ungarn," so often that it appears in the writing of his subordinates within 6 months of them being assigned to him.

Born in 1852, Conrad was trained at the Theresian Military Academy, and developed a keen interest in the Mechanical Sciences. Following his commission in 1871, he was assigned command of a Jager Battalion in Tyrol, and it is here we see some of his earliest thoughts on infantry tactics develop. 5 years later he graduated from the Imperial War College, and was placed on the General Staff Corps. Despite his fascination with the political realities of warfare and military development, Conrad kept abreast of mechanical developments, particularly in firearm technologies. While a member of the General Staff Corps, he published a series of influential papers in a variety of fields. The first was on the implementation of modern, for 1882, rifles in infantry tactics, based on his experiences in the Condominium of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was followed by a paper on mechanical developments and how they could be integrated into firearms, which put him into direct correspondence with –REDACTED–, –REDACTED–, and –REDACTED–. His two publications of 1886, however, cemented his status as one of the foremost Austro-Hungarian thinkers on war: the first on the utility of fortress cities in Galicia and their ability to blunt a border wide Russian offensive, while the second dealt with a proposed reorganization of the K.u.K. Armee and the Imperial and Royal War Ministry, including the local Austrian and Hungarian Ministries, into a unified command that would have overall authority in time of war and for training and equipment purposes.(2) Together, Conrad's innate understanding of the strategic considerations, his grasp of the rapidly shifting nature of infantry tactics that was being driven by technological development, and his awareness of the physical developments that led to his tactical comprehension all combined to form a commander who was uniquely suited to the rapidly shifting manner of war at the turn of the century. And when Conrad was appointed a lecturer on military tactics at the Imperial War College in 1888, he was able to form an entire generation of the Austro-Hungarian Officer Corps, many of whom would go onto be principal commanders in 1914.

(1) lit. the Hungarians never damned enough. More properly, the never sufficiently damned Hungarians

(2) Conrad recognized that this was a very touchy subject given the Compromise of 1867. His proposed reorganization thus attempted to not violate the Compromise, while also allowing the formation of what we would consider a modern joint command structure over all branches – Army, Navy, and, eventually, Air Forces.