Chapter 322 Choice

Certainly, Wilhelm was well aware that the development of tactics and technology must complement each other. When guided weapons were not yet mature, one had to obediently use "old-fashioned" weapons like machine guns and cannons.

Otherwise, it would end up like the United States Air Force during the Vietnam War, carrying air-to-air missiles with abysmal hit rates, almost equivalent to having none, and getting shot down by the Vietnamese with machine guns scattered all over.

Shortly after World War II, based on the conceptual foundation of the German X-4 air-to-air missile, the United States and the Soviet Union both developed their own air-to-air missiles and made significant improvements in guidance methods. These included infrared guidance and radar guidance methods.

During the Cold War, the most famous infrared-guided missiles were the U.S. AIM-9B "Sidewinder" and the Soviet K13 "Atoll" air-to-air missiles. Both missiles used non-cryogenic lead sulfide infrared detectors and ultra-compact electronic tube signal amplifiers, allowing them to track and attack enemy fighters. However, compared to more advanced air-to-air missiles in later years, these missiles were somewhat cumbersome, with a maximum attack range of only about 3 kilometers. Even the performance of the "Sparrow 1" air-to-air missile with semi-active radar guidance, used by the U.S. military during the same period, was not much different.

In the 1960s, it was the fastest period of development for air-to-air missiles. Military powers worldwide had upgraded to new-generation air-to-air missiles. For example, France's Matra R530, the Soviet Union's R-60T, and the U.S. AIM-9D Sidewinder air-to-air missiles were all improved versions of the first-generation infrared-guided second-generation air-to-air missiles.

The second generation introduced transistor circuit signals and processing technologies such as proximity fuses, achieving unprecedented stability and increased attack ranges. Meanwhile, radar-guided air-to-air missiles had also progressed to the second generation. For instance, the U.S. Sparrow 3A air-to-air missile, compared to the first-generation Sparrow 1, added continuous-wave semi-active radar guidance technology.

During this period, designers of air combat weapons worldwide unanimously believed that missiles would inevitably replace cannon weapons in future aerial combat, and the aerial combat mode of fighter planes would also be simplified. American fighter designers especially emphasized this point. For example, the later-developed U.S. military fighters like the F-105 Thunderchief and the F-4 Phantom II initially did not install close-range cannon weapons.

It was precisely because of the excessive reliance of the U.S. Air Force on air-to-air missiles that later led to their embarrassment during the Vietnam War. Many U.S. pilots who participated in the Vietnam War experienced a situation where after launching infrared-guided dogfight missiles, the air-to-air missiles completely ignored enemy aircraft and instead "rushed towards the sun."

This was because the fighters of that time did not yet possess the technology to lock onto specific infrared sources. In simple terms, the air-to-air missiles of that time would only pursue obvious infrared sources, such as the sun on a clear day. The clear infrared source emitted by the sun would attract the air-to-air missile to fly straight toward it. This might seem amusing, but for the U.S. military pilots in aerial combat, it was nothing to laugh about.

Some might say, "What about the 'Sparrow' radar-guided missiles?" U.S. pilots from that time would curse upon hearing this name. The launch procedure for Sparrow air-to-air missiles was too cumbersome, often resulting in missing the target aircraft. Moreover, its hit rate was extremely low. According to statistics, the U.S. Air Force launched a total of 589 missiles during the Vietnam War, with a pitiful hit rate of only 10%. In other words, nearly 530 missiles missed their targets. According to U.S. records, during the Vietnam War, the U.S. military lost more than 2,600 fighter aircraft.

This clearly illustrates the extent of the losses and humiliation suffered by the U.S. Air Force during the Vietnam War because the MiG series fighters, which were contemporaneous adversaries of the U.S., were equipped with cannons and often made U.S. fighters flee in a sorry state.

At that time, U.S. fighters were only equipped with short-range air-to-air missiles. Infrared-guided launches often failed daily, and radar-guided accuracy was very low (no multi-target lock-on attack, only one missile per aircraft, and it was semi-active radar-guided, requiring the fighter pilot to control guidance afterward, making the fighter vulnerable to attacks). Dealing with enemy fighters was relatively straightforward, but if they pulled off some aerial maneuvers, the missiles often missed.

Therefore, in aerial combat situations, U.S. fighter planes often launched multiple missiles in a short period, quickly depleting their ammunition. At this point, facing enemy fighters equipped with cannons, they had no means of retaliation and could only call for support or quickly escape the battlefield.

The result was apparent: the United States suddenly lost a bunch of experienced pilots in Vietnam, and the remaining pilots cried out to have gun pods mounted on their planes.

However, even with gun pods mounted, the situation did not improve significantly. This was because the opponents of the United States had already developed a set of raid tactics, and the performance of the Phantom II was very weak against this type of tactic. But as the saying goes, when one door closes, another must open. The Americans suddenly discovered that the Phantom II was very effective for close air support, bombing ground targets (commonly known as "carpet bombing") and having a great time.

Correspondingly, the U.S. Navy found that the A-4 Skyhawk performed relatively well in low-altitude air combat.

Then a very strange thing happened. While the A-4 Skyhawk, clearly an attack aircraft, chased Vietnamese MiGs in aerial combat with its machine guns, the F-4 Phantom II, a fighter, was frantically bombing the ground.

It was precisely because of the dismal performance of U.S. air-to-air missiles in Vietnam that the U.S. military, after the war, emphasized learning from the lessons, summarizing experiences, and immediately began the development of the third generation of air-to-air missiles. By the 1990s, the U.S. military had developed the "Sidewinder," a third-generation air-to-air missile. Simultaneously, Russia's R73 and Israel's Python 3, among other third-generation or third-and-a-half-generation missiles, came into existence. These new-generation air-to-air missiles mainly incorporated digital processing technology, enhancing the missiles' attack capabilities and resistance to interference.

At this point, air-to-air missiles could finally be considered up to the task.

Now, in the year 39 (1939), still more than half a century away from the 1990s, even if Wilhelm's knowledge could significantly accelerate Germany's technological development, it would still take until the mid-to-late 1960s to produce a decent air-to-air missile.

However, Wilhelm couldn't decide which one to choose between the MiG-15 and the F-86 Sabre as the future mainstay for the German Air Force.

At least in his view, both the MiG-15 and the F-86 were excellent aircraft, and they were, at least, among the most dazzling stars of their generation. The MiG-15 seemed to have slightly better vertical maneuverability, reflecting the profound impression left by the German Eastern Front Air Force on the Soviets. The F-86 had better horizontal maneuverability, slightly longer range, showcasing the imperialistic attributes of the Americans – a fighter that could keep up with escorting bombers.

Therefore, Wilhelm leaned more towards the F-86 Sabre. After all, Germany would need a long-range escort fighter for its strategic bombing, and in actual combat, the F-86's performance was not inferior to the MiG-15, which made it quite enticing.

However, the actual combat experience of German fighter pilots was more aligned with the performance characteristics of the MiG-15. Most German pilots preferred a high-altitude, high-speed dive-and-dash assault tactic. So, after using the MiG-15, the German Air Force's actual combat performance might turn out better, one never knows.

After much consideration, Wilhelm decided to compile the blueprints for both jet fighters and hand them over to Messerschmitt, letting the pilots decide for themselves. (TLN: Yeah, just "compile" some blueprints for future jet fighters...)