Chapter 339 The Winter War (8)

In fact, before the war began, Boris Mikhaylovich Shaposhnikov, the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Red Army, was tasked with drafting a battle plan. His plan objectively considered the combat capabilities of the Finnish military and the special conditions of the battlefield, providing a correct estimate that the war would last for several months (based on the original timeline's circumstances, it is clear that this Chief of Staff had considerable foresight and strategic insight).

Unfortunately, the bitter pill of reality was not to Stalin's liking. He believed that the mighty Soviet Union should defeat the weak Finland in a shorter period. Therefore, the Soviet Union appointed Meretskov, the commander of the Leningrad Military District, as the overall commander on the front lines. In order to quickly conquer Finland, partial mobilization was even implemented, involving a total of 425,640 soldiers, 2,876 various artillery pieces and mortars, 2,289 tanks, and 2,446 aircraft.

The operational sequence was led by the Leningrad Military District, with the Seventh Army, Eighth Army, Ninth Army, and Fourteenth Army under its command. The battle plan was as follows:

1. The 7th Army would advance north from Leningrad along the western shore of Lake Ladoga, break through the Mannerheim Line in Finland, capture the second-largest Finnish city Viipuri, and advance to the capital Helsinki by the third day of the offensive.

2. The 8th Army would be deployed on the east bank of Lake Ladoga, tasked with engaging Finnish forces on the flank to support the 7th Army.

3. In central Finland, the 9th Army would be deployed, with the task of splitting its forces into two routes, with the left heading straight for Oulu and the right for Kemi, cutting Finland in half and severing overland communication with Sweden.

4. In the Lapland direction, the 14th Army would be deployed, attacking the Petsamo area from Murmansk in the west, then advancing 500 kilometers south along the Arctic Circle Highway before heading west until reaching the Swedish border.

This operational plan seemed perfect on paper, with the Red Army leveraging its numerical and equipment advantages to divide Finland into pieces that couldn't coordinate. Even if the Finnish forces, at a significant numerical disadvantage, were prepared, they couldn't defend along the lengthy border, and the advance of the Red Army should be unstoppable. The Soviet leadership was confident, with the Deputy Minister of Defense instructing artillery units to prepare only twelve days' worth of ammunition, and a military band prepared to lead a parade into Helsinki.

But now, the air force has suffered a major setback, while the ground forces are already eagerly advancing. Leading the charge is the 35th Light Tank Brigade, equipped with a total of 136 T-26 tanks, 10 KhT-26, 3 ST-26, 10 BA-10, and 10 BA-20, totaling 149 tanks.

In the original timeline, the T-26 was extensively used in three wars before World War II: the Spanish Civil War, the Battle of Khalkhin Gol, and the Soviet-Finnish War. In these wars, the T-26 fulfilled its intended roles, such as suppressing enemy light tanks, penetrating weak defenses, and swiftly maneuvering to encircle enemy infantry. However, its limitations became apparent when facing heavily fortified enemy positions, especially those reinforced with anti-tank firepower. This is quite normal since it was a light tank, and even German and American light tanks couldn't achieve such tasks.

The T-26 did experience significant combat losses, not due to inherent design flaws but rather some simplifications made by the Soviet Union. For a light tank like the T-26, its armor could only withstand light weapons. To improve battlefield survivability, efforts had to be focused on two aspects: mobility and good observational capabilities. High mobility reduces the chances of being hit, while good visibility helps detect threats and evade them. The T-26 excelled in mobility with high speed but suffered a reduction in the commander's observational ability due to the elimination of the turret. Additionally, the T-26 commander also served as the gunner, leaving little time for comprehensive observation during combat. This made it vulnerable to firepower from the sides and rear. Furthermore, the T-26 had poor fire control and lacked precision shooting capabilities. It was said to achieve a higher hit rate only within 300 meters, which was quite risky given the T-26's weak armor at such close ranges.

The T-26 essentially represented the consistent characteristics of Soviet tanks: good armor, high speed, emphasis on firepower, but poor observational capabilities, low shooting accuracy, and inadequate human-machine engineering.

Just when they were less than four kilometers from the Finnish defense line, a thunderous explosion occurred, and the leading T-26 instantly turned into a blazing heap.

"Anti-tank landmine!" exclaimed Brigade Commander Ogurcov involuntarily.

Military enthusiasts are well aware that the thickness of a tank's armor varies in different locations.

The most vulnerable positions on the battlefield are the frontal armor, followed by the side armor, while the top and bottom are less likely to be attacked. When designing tanks, countries tend to increase the thickness of the parts most susceptible to attacks, following the principle that "thickness is proportional to the probability of being attacked." The reason for this is clear – to create a tank with the strongest protection using the minimum weight.

Anti-tank mines are weapons that exploit this vulnerability of tanks. In 1916, the world saw the first tank enter the stage of warfare, and due to the lack of effective weapons against tanks, they rampaged unchecked on the battlefield. In response, Germany, the adversary of the British at that time, modified artillery shells into mines specifically designed to target tanks in 1918.

This was the earliest form of anti-track mine.

An anti-track mine, as the name suggests, is designed to target tank treads, and these mines only detonate when a tank applies pressure.

Subsequently, anti-belly armor mines appeared (while anti-track mines mainly targeted treads, anti-belly armor mines performed "abdominal surgery" on tanks, incidentally causing casualties among the crew); dual-purpose mines that were anti-track and anti-belly armor, attacking tanks from multiple angles; anti-side armor mines (inspired by anti-tank rocket launchers, these mines were generally installed on both sides of roads that tanks were expected to pass. They used sensors like infrared or millimeter-wave radar to locate tanks. Whenever a tank passed, the sensor detected it and triggered the mine to penetrate the tank's side armor. Of course, during World War II, such advanced mines were not available).

Now, seeing that T-26 being directly turned into a blazing heap, Ogurcov knew that the enemy had laid powerful anti-belly armor mines. Although he wanted to caution other tanks about the mines on the ground, it was impossible. Mines buried in the ground wouldn't have any markings. All he could do was hope that the mine density wouldn't be too high, allowing them to reach the Finnish defense line with minimal losses.

Unfortunately, things were not as simple as he imagined. Tanks charging forward triggered a series of mine explosions, and after losing more than thirty tanks in a row, Brigade Commander Ogurcov was forced to issue the order to stop the advance.

The density of these anti-tank mines was too high. Charging forward like this would lead to total annihilation.