-The Road to Paris-

Kaiser Wilhelm II's insistence on colonial expansion and his hardline foreign policy were motivated more by his desire to suppress domestic social problems than by his desire to fight imperialism.

　During Bismarck's time, Germany had achieved its long-cherished dream of becoming a unified empire led by the German people, but it is also true that the country was plagued by various problems behind the scenes of the rapid social change.

　Colonial policy diverted the nation's attention from domestic issues to foreign issues, and demonstrating a firm and willingness to go to war in diplomacy was the most effective way to unite the fledgling German Empire.

(I lack the experience and ability of my grandfather, nor the wisdom of Bismarck. For a young man like me to unite the country, we must face a common enemy: foreign nations...)

　Organizations, not just nations, often need an "enemy." Internal conflicts rarely occur when fighting an external enemy, but there are many examples in history where internal conflicts surfaced as soon as the external enemy disappeared.

　In particular, Germany was divided for a long time, and it was only during the reign of his father, Kaiser Wilhelm I, that the brilliant Chancellor Bismarck used political intrigue to somehow achieve unification.

　--Above all, the history of German unification itself was created by fighting a "common enemy."

　Originally, the unification of Germany was a conflict between "Greater Germanism" led by Austria and "Little Germanism" led by Prussia, which excluded it.

The Little Germany movement, which was initially at a disadvantage, was ultimately victorious because Bismarck took advantage of the growing "nationalism" among Germans and made Austria, a multi-ethnic state, a "common enemy."

　Next, Bismarck used nationalism to encourage the German people to unite by creating a common enemy, France. Despite differences in wealth and social status, they were all "Germans," so they should work together to fight against France.

　Bismarck, the most brilliant strategist, did not necessarily rely solely on domestic public opinion, but instead skillfully used a variety of means depending on the situation, including the networks of the upper class and the delicate balance of power between nations.

　However, this was an exquisite political acrobatics that could only have been pulled off by Bismarck, who possessed an extraordinary intellect, and Wilhelm I, who had boasted a strong presence in high society for many years.

　If the young and inexperienced Kaiser Wilhelm II had tried to lead Germany in the same way, he would have had no choice but to vent his frustration to the people by taking a firm stance against the "common enemy."

(Still, it's far better than having your own people fighting each other. Half the population died in the Thirty Years' War, when Germans fought each other...)

　That is why Wilhelm II could not hide his anguish at the unprecedented bloodbath of World War I. The hardline foreign stance to protect the German people from a civil war was shifting to an all-out war with unprecedented bloodbaths. In a sense, this was the result of his own incompetence and immaturity.

(...But I am the Emperor of a unified Germany. I cannot run away.)

He would waver. He would regret. But he would never stop moving forward... that was the greatest responsibility Wilhelm, born as the German Emperor, could fulfill as a member of royalty.

　**

　About two weeks after the start of the war...

　German forces that invaded Belgium were temporarily held up at the Liège fortress, but managed to enter the capital, Brussels, on August 20.

"The surrender of Belgium is imminent. We will be able to enter France in four days."

　This was reported by Erich von Falkenhayn, commander of the Western Army.

　Falkenhayn's realist analysis was that while Belgium could be taken, it would be difficult to encircle and annihilate the French army as planned in the Schlieffen Plan.

(Since Joffre abandoned Plan 17, French troops are gathering in the north... Five British divisions have already landed in Belgium, and I've heard that a million volunteers are being recruited from the colonies.)

　Currently, the German army has its 1st, 2nd, and 3rd armies in Belgium, the 4th and 5th armies in the Ardennes, the 6th and 7th armies in Alsace-Lorraine, and the 8th Army, which was transported from the east, in strategic reserve.

　The 8th Army was in strategic reserve not for operational reasons, but because supply limits meant that there was no point in sending any more reinforcements to the front lines.

　Meanwhile, the French Army had its 1st and 2nd Armies in Alsace-Lorraine, its 3rd Army in the Ardennes, its 4th and 5th Armies in Belgium, and its 6th and 9th Armies in strategic reserve.

Pétain's decision, made after seeing the already superior German army further strengthened by Russia's decision not to enter the war, could be seen as either a wise decision or an unfounded worry, judging from the results. Although he was denounced as a "coward" by some extremists, through his vigorous mobilization he managed to bring the numbers up to an equal level.

　Although the German army was still one army, or about 100,000 stronger, when the remnants of the Belgian army and the British Expeditionary Force were added, their fighting strength was nearly equal.

　In fact, at present it is Falkenhayn and the other German soldiers who are in trouble.

(Although our forces in Alsace-Lorraine are slightly more numerous than the French, we are not confident in our offensive. And yet there is no sign of the French attacking...)

　Time and speed are important.

　If the French were to build a defensive line while facing unexpectedly strong resistance from the Belgian and British armies, they would be unable to encircle and annihilate the enemy. In that case, they would have no choice but to launch a frontal attack that would incur heavy losses, resulting in a stalemate on the front lines and prolonging the war.

(However, the First Army, which was the "wing" responsible for the encirclement, was severely exhausted by the long-distance forced marches. Due to the Belgian army's scorched earth tactics, supplies were at their limit. Even if troops were sent indiscriminately to the front line, ammunition and food would not reach the front line.)

The Austro-Prussian War, which marked the start of the German Empire's great advance, and the Franco-Prussian War, were also plagued by logistical problems that constantly plagued the General Staff. It is generally believed that the German army's rapid mobilization using railways was a victory, but in fact the movement was only rapid up to the border where the railways were located. Naturally, the enemy's railways were destroyed so that they could not be used.

　Therefore, once the border was crossed, the only way was to transport ammunition and food to the front line using horses and men, just like in the Napoleonic Wars. In fact, supplies that could not be transported to the front line in the Austro-Prussian War and the Franco-Prussian War piled up along the border, and this shortcoming was hardly improved in this war.

(Although the eastern front had been lost due to Russian opportunism, the 8th Army that had been transported from the east was left idle without a logistical network to send it to the front lines...)

　In Falkenhayn's eyes, things are going from bad to worse. The French army under Joffre is dodging Belgium's requests for help and it seems as though they are just trying to buy time by abandoning the tiny country.

　In addition, information that General Kitchener was accelerating his efforts to build a huge new army in Britain also made Falkenhayn anxious.

(I hope this doesn't turn into a quagmire of attrition...)

　Falkenhayn's gloomy predictions soon came true. Even with the reincarnation of Stalin and the reinterpretation of history, the times seemed to be calling for a disastrous war of attrition in Europe.