The Withdrawal

On the 27th of December at about 02:45, after the last stragglers had cleared the block, a Japanese armored column, apparently advance elements of the 4th Tank Regiment, reached the spot. Fire from the American tanks and SPM's swept the highway and adjoining ditches. The Japanese were taken completely by surprise and after fifteen minutes pulled back. Fearing encirclement by Japanese infantry, Miller and Peck then struck out for Moncada. The tanks and the SPM that had formed the roadblock moved slowly down Route 3 in the dark hours before dawn. They reached the rail crossing in Moncada only a scant ten minutes before the 11th Division troop trains entered the town. Once the trains had cleared the danger point, Colonel Miller continued his march south and reached the D-3 line at Gerona at about 08:30 on the morning of 27 December. Here he was joined by the survivors of the battalion's Company D. Cut off from the retreat, the company had come south along an old carabao cart trail, the Manila Railroad tracks, and Route 3. It found the bridge just below Moncada destroyed and was forced to leave its fifteen tanks north of the stream. This decision had been made in the hope that some of the men could return later with guides and bring the tanks south. This expectation could not be fulfilled and the tanks were lost for the rest of the campaign. General MacArthur summed up his situation on 27 December as follows: "Enemy penetration in the Philippines resulted from our weakness on the sea and in the air. Surface elements of the Asiatic Fleet were withdrawn and the effect of the submarines has been negligible. Lack of airfields for modern planes prevented defensive dispersion and lack of pursuit planes permitted unhindered day bombardment. The enemy has had utter freedom of naval and air movements." For these reasons, he could have added the unsatisfactory performance of the ill-trained and poorly equipped Philippine Army reservists. By the evening of 24 December, the Japanese had successfully completed the first and most difficult part of their plan for the conquest of the Philippines. In the south, at a cost of 84 dead and 184 wounded, General Morioka had landed his reduced division of 7,000 men. American resistance had held up the advance of some units, but the main force of the 16th Division had swept ahead, with the armored cars of the 16th Reconnaissance in the van. Unloading had progressed satisfactorily, and many of the service and supporting units had already landed. The roads leading westward through the Tayabas Mountains had been secured, and the troops of the Lamon Bay Force were in the position to reach Tayabas Bay the following morning. General Homma had not expected much from this force. Its success came, therefore, as "quite a surprise" to 14th Army headquarters at Lingayen Gulf, and, as the Japanese later confessed, "The result realized was more than expected." North of Manila the Lingayen Force stood ready to drive on to the Agno River. After several days of difficulties, the beachhead had been organized and heavy supplies and equipment brought ashore. San Fabian to the south had been occupied and the American artillery there driven out. The north and east flanks of the coastal corridor had been secured, and Japanese troops were pouring out on to the central plain to add their weight to the advance on Manila, 100 miles away.

WAR PLAN ORANGE or WPO - 3 is aptly described in its subtitle as "The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945." It traces the development of scenarios for defeating Japan, code-named Orange, in a hypothetical conflict with the United States. The acquisition of the Philippines by the United States after the Spanish-American War made the war hypothetical, but it became increasingly probable during the 1920s and 1930s, emerging as a grim reality on December 7, at that point, planning had indeed become essential. Before the war, General MacArthur had determined that he would meet a Japanese attack by offensive action, not by what he considered to be the passive defense provided for in WPO-3. Accordingly, he had ordered his force commanders to meet the Japanese at the beaches and to drive them back into the sea. There was to be "no withdrawal from beach positions." The first Japanese landings between the 8th and 10th of December had caused no change in this strategy. Once the Japanese had landed, General MacArthur had to consider seriously the prospect of an eventual withdrawal to Bataan and the evacuation of Manila. To prepare President Quezon for the worst, he sent word to him on the morning of the 12th to be ready to move to Corregidor on four hours' notice. Shocked and wholly unprepared for this "startling message," Quezon arranged a conference with MacArthur that night at the Manila Hotel. At the meeting, MacArthur explained that there was no immediate cause for concern and that he was only "preparing for the worst in case the Japanese should land in great force at different places." In such an event, it would be unwise, he told Quezon, to have his forces scattered. He intended to concentrate his army on Bataan, and to move his headquarters, the High Commissioner's office, and the Commonwealth Government to Corregidor and declare Manila an open city. "Do you mean, General," asked Quezon, "that tomorrow you will declare Manila an open city and that sometime during the day we shall have to go to Corregidor?" MacArthur's answer was an emphatic "No." He did not seem to be certain that the move would even be necessary and was evidently only preparing the President for such a possibility. The meeting closed with Quezon's promise to consider the matter further. Later he consented, with reluctance, to move to Corregidor if necessary. The possibility of withdrawal seems to have been in the minds of other officers in MacArthur's headquarters before the main Japanese landings. During an inspection of the 21st Field Artillery sector along Lingayen Gulf, Col. Constant L. Irwin, MacArthur's G-3, showed little interest in the tactical placement of the guns. He seemed concerned, instead, with the location of the ammunition and supply routes, selected to conform with the mission of holding at the beaches. "He took a look at our ammunition disposition and the dangerous supply routes," wrote Colonel Mallonee, instructor of the 21st Field Artillery, "and very violently announced that it would be impossible to withdraw the ammunition in time to save it. ..." This was the first time, remarked Mallonee, that he heard the word "withdraw." He explained to Colonel Irwin that his orders were to hold at all costs, and repeated Wainwright's order: "We must die in our tracks, falling not backward but forward toward the enemy." The answer of the G--3 officer was, "Don't believe everything you hear."

War Plan Orange describes a mission of American forces' withdrawal to Bataan to hold out long enough for the American Navy to sail across the Pacific with the US reinforcements, supplies, and firepower needed to drive back the enemies to Japan. But there was a problem that would be an obstacle with War Plan Orange. President Roosevelt's plan was to defeat Hitler first as America was now joined the European war. The plan was to focus the resources only to the war with the Nazi Germans, therefore there would be no supplies and reinforcements to come in the Pacific. The out-gunned USAFFE Soldiers would later fight back with what they only have. The North Luzon Force plan of withdrawal was based on the five delaying positions or lines selected and reconnoitered during peacetime. Separated by the estimated distance which could be covered in one night's march, these lines utilized the terrain features advantageously in defense rivers, high ground, and swamps. Each was anchored on high ground and took full advantage of natural barriers. They lay across the face of the central Luzon plain and covered the main approaches to Manila, Routes 3 and 5. The first defensive line, known as D-1, extended in an easterly direction from Aguilar, south of Lingayen Gulf on Route 13, through San Carlos to Urdaneta on Route 3. As Col. William F. Maher, Wainwright's chief of staff, has observed, the D-1 line "was simply a line on which we hoped to be able to reorganize the badly disorganized forces north of the Agno River." The second position, the D-2 line, extended in general along the arc of the Agno River, one of the formidable natural barriers in the central plain. After holding for one day on this line, the troops were to retire next to the D-3 line, stretching from Santa Ignacia on the west through Gerona and Guimba to San Jose on the east. The D-4 line was approximately twenty-five miles long and extended from Tarlac on the left (west) to Cabanatuan on the right. Small rivers and streams intersected this line, which, at Cabanatuan, was anchored on the Pampanga River. The final and most southerly position called the D-5 line, stretched from Bamban in front of Mt. Arayat, across Route 5 to Sibul Springs. Southeast of Mt. Arayat, between the Pampanga River and Route 5, was the Candaba Swamp, which broke the central plain into two narrow corridors leading toward Manila. Of the five lines, only the last, the D-5 line, was to be organized for a protracted defense. Approximately forty miles in length, the D-3 line stretched across the Luzon central plain midway between Lingayen Gulf and San Fernando, Pampanga, from a point just west of Santa Ignacia on Route 13 to San Jose in Nueva Ecija Province, at the junction of Routes 5 and 8. Deployed along this line were the 91st, 11th, and 21st Divisions (PA), supported by the Provisional Tank Group and the 75-mm. guns (SPM). The right (east) flank, resting on the foothills of the Sierra Madre, was held by the 91st Division which had taken up positions across Route 5 and on the south bank of a small river in the vicinity of San Jose between Route 5 and Gerona on Route 3 were the 11th Division and the bulk of the Tank Group--the 194th at Gerona and the 192d to its right. After a long journey of the 21st Division from La Union to Tarlac, my grandfather with his comrades stood on a rocky road upon arriving, to rest for a while. He expected much more dangers has to face, as the plan of withdrawal to Bataan has just begun. The 21st Division, whose two columns had reunited at Camiling, Tarlac was in position between Gerona and Santa Ignacia at the edge of the Zambales Mountains. Despite occasional alarms, there was no action on the D-3 line on 27 December. That night the North Luzon Force made ready to fall back to the D-4 line. The 91st Division began pulling out at about 17:30 and by 04:30 had reached the south bank. Two hours later the entire unit was ordered into the line between Cabanatuan and Carmen, Nueva Ecija, a barrio on the road ten miles west of Cabanatuan and not to be confused with the village of the same name on the Agno. At Carmen, the 91st Division tied in with units of the 11th Infantry that had withdrawn from the D-3 line during the night and was deployed from Carmen west to La Paz. The 21st Division stood on the left of the 11th Division, extending the line to Tarlac, where Route 13 joined Route 3 and the main track of the Manila Railroad. The tanks were in general support. On the Agno River, the Japanese halted to consolidate their position and bring up more troops. During the 27th, artillery, armor, and service troops moved forward to join the 48th Division.

On the 28th of December, the North Luzon Force was on the D-4 line. In the face of a well trained and better-equipped enemy, it had fulfilled its mission-to hold the Agno line until the night of 26-27 December and to withdraw to the Tarlac-Cabanatuan line. Now, from positions along this line, the troops in North Luzon awaited the next attack. On 3 December, when Wainwright received his mission, his North Luzon Force consisted of three Philippine Army divisions the 11th, 21st, and 31st-the 26th Cavalry (PS), one battalion of the 45th Infantry (PS) on Bataan, two batteries of 155-mm. guns, and one battery of 2.95- inch mountain guns. The 71st Division (PA), though assigned to the North Luzon Force, could be committed only to the authority of USAFFE. Wainwright was promised additional troops when they arrived from the United States or were mobilized by the Philippine Army. The South Luzon Force, under Brig. Gen. George M. Parker, Jr., was assigned the area generally south and east of Manila. As the force to the north, it was to protect the airfields in its sector and prevent hostile landings. General Parker was also enjoined to hold the beaches at all costs. The South Luzon Force was much smaller than that in the north. It consisted initially of only two Philippine Army divisions, the 41st and 51st, and a battery of field artillery. Additional units were to be assigned at a later date when they became available. The Visayan-Mindanao Force under Brig. Gen. William F. Sharp was charged with the defense of the rest of the archipelago. Its primary mission was to protect the airfields to be built in the Visayas; its secondary mission was to "prevent landings of hostile raiding parties, paying particular attention to the cities and essential public utilities." Since landings in force south of Luzon would not have had any decisive results, no mention was made of the necessity of holding the beaches. The Visayan-Mindanao sector would also include the coastal defenses of the inland seas when these were completed and General Sharp was to provide protection for these as well. One battalion of the force was to be prepared to move to Del Monte in Mindanao with the mission of guarding the recently completed bomber base there. No American or Philippine Scout troops were assigned to the Visayan-Mindanao Force, except those in headquarters. For the rest, the force consisted of the 61st, 81st, and 101st Divisions, all Philippine Army. On Luzon, between the North and South Luzon Forces was the reserve area, including the city of Manila and the heavily congested area just to the north. This area was directly under the control of MacArthur's headquarters and contained the Philippine Division (less one battalion), the 91st Division (PA), the 86th Field Artillery (PS), the Far East Air Force, and the headquarters of the Philippine Department and the Philippine Army. After the bloody battles occurred in Lingayen and La Union, the 21st, 11th and other USAFFE Divisions were just kept on moving towards Central Luzon in order to achieve the withdrawal described in War Plan Orange. The USAFFE's North Luzon force became silent in action with only a few supplies of food such as local bread like Pan de Sal(Salted Bread) and Sausages from the US, until the new year's day of 1942. They were aboard in Military trucks with supporting tanks from behind, and just resting when night falls inside the improvised tents and some were just sleeping under the trees. They usually spend their nights in remote areas, with only a very few hours of sleep as they must be all alert to secure themselves from possible unexpected hostile actions of the better-equipped enemy. There were mosquitos and different insects surrounded them including the beautiful fireflies that illuminate the darkness beneath the night sky.

By the first week of January 1942, the American and Filipino troops withdrawing from both ends of Luzon had joined at San Fernando and begun the last lap of their journey to Bataan. In ten days they had retired from Lingayen Gulf and Lamon Bay to Guagua and Porac, on the two roads leading into Bataan. There they had halted and established a line only fifteen miles from the base of the peninsula. The longer they could hold, the more time would be available to prepare the final defenses in Bataan. Along the ten-mile line from Guagua to Porac, paralleling the road between the two barrios, General Wainwright had placed the 11th and 21st Divisions (PA), as well as armor and cavalry. On the left (west), around Porac, was the 21st Division with the 26th Cavalry (PS) to its rear, in force reserve. On the east was the 11th Division, its right flank covered by almost impenetrable swamps crisscrossed by numerous streams. In support of both divisions was General Weaver's tank group. The troops along this line, the best in the North Luzon Force, though battle-tested and protected by mountains on the west and swamps on the east, felt exposed and insecure. They were convinced that they were opposing the entire Japanese 14th Army, estimated, according to Colonel Mallonée, to number 120,000 men. Actually, Japanese strength on Luzon was about half that size, and only two reinforced regiments with tanks and artillery faced the men on the Guagua-Porac line. On the 2nd day of January 1942 while arriving from San Fernando to Porac my grandfather said with an exciting feeling, "We're near to my hometown, we're only a few kilometers away from Lubao. How I miss the place. If we resisted the enemy attack today here in Pampanga, I'll bring you to our residence and we'll harvest Mangoes there." Silent laughs were reactions received by my grandfather Teddy, but he could feel that he had able to encourage them and made them drift their negative thoughts away. They smiled temporarily while seeing the happiest moments together with their families through a daydream. During the time, American plans for a counterattack were premature. The evening before, the main force of the Takahashi Detachment had left its assembly area midway between Bamban and Angeles and marched rapidly toward Porac. The 8th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment (less one battalion), with its 105-mm. guns had accompanied the force and by morning was in the position to support the infantry attack. Thus, when the 2d Battalion, 23d Infantry, began to advance it was met first by punishing small-arms fire from the infantry, then by fire from the 105-mm. guns of the 8th Field Artillery. At the same time, three Japanese aircraft swung low to strafe the road in support of the enemy attack. The momentum of the advance carried the Japanese below Pio, where they were finally stopped. When news of the attack reached General Wainwright's headquarters, the most alarming item in the report was the presence of Japanese medium artillery, thought to be heavy guns, on the left of the American line. This artillery represented a serious threat, and the 21st Division was ordered to "hold the line or die where you are." The 21st Divison reached the town of Bacolor when a serious of Japanese airstrikes and tank attack has been launched. The Soldiers had to move out of the trucks to secure and defend themselves. They grabbed their weapons and crawled upon the ground to fight back the approaching enemies. The USAFFE Tank battalion started firing while the 21st Divisions were scattered throughout the town. My grandfather was on the ground in a prone position behind the gigantic root of the acacia tree and placed the M1917 .30-caliber Browning Machine Gun in front. He fired a hundred shots and had able to injure and kill numerous enemies when he got a gunshot on his shoulder by a Japanese Sniper. He was rescued by a comrade who accompanied him with the Browning Machine Gun. They successfully relocated while the gunshots of the sniper were continued for a few minutes. My grandfather said, "Just leave me, save yourself, my friend. It's just a wound, I could still survive. Go! Secure yourself!", the Soldier then had to leave. General Capinpin did his best, but he had only two battalions of the 23d Infantry, an unseasoned and untrained unit, left in reserve. One of these battalions was in North Luzon Force reserve and it was now ordered to move to the 11th Division sector which was behind the 21st Division near Guagua where a heavy fight was in progress. My grandfather Teddy eventually rescued by a Combat medic from 23d Infantry. He said, "Just remove the bullet and I'll go with my comrades. We need to lessen the enemies or we all die like preys!" He stated while gasping. The medic removed the bullet from his shoulder and had to use first aid then covered the wound by bondage. After the battle, they brought my grandfather to their barracks, to heal and close the wound by surgery.

On the afternoon of the 4th, as a result of pressure on the 11th Division to the east, General Wainwright ordered the 21st Division to withdraw under cover of darkness to the line of the Gumain River, about eight miles south of Porac. That night the division began to move back after successfully breaking contact with the enemy. Despite the absence of enemy pressure, there was considerable confusion during the withdrawal. By daylight of the 5th, however, the troops were across the Gumain where they began to prepare for their next stand. Division headquarters, the 23d Infantry, the division signal company, and other special units were at Dinalupihan, with the 21st Field Artillery located just east of the town. The Japanese attack on the right flank of the Guagua-Porac line came on the 3rd of January. Leaving San Fernando at 04:00 the reinforced Tanaka Detachment had advanced cautiously along Route 7. At about 09:30 the point of the Japanese column made contact with a platoon of tanks from Company C, 194th, posted about 1,000 yards north of Guagua. Under tank fire and confined to the road because of the marshy terrain on both sides, the Japanese halted to await the arrival of the main force. About noon, when the force in front became too formidable, the American tanks fell back to Guagua. The Japanese continued to advance slowly. Forced by the nature of the terrain into a frontal assault along the main road and slowed down by the numerous villages along the line of advance, the attack, the Japanese admitted, "did not progress as planned." Artillery was brought in to support and, late in the afternoon, the 75-mm. guns opened fire, scoring at least one hit on the 11th Infantry command post. The defending infantry was greatly cheered by the sound of their own artillery answering the Japanese guns. Organized after the start of the war and inadequately trained, the men of the 11th Field Artillery, firing from positions at Guagua and Santa Rita, made up in enthusiasm what they lacked in skill. The Japanese artillery fire continued during the night and increased in intensity the next morning, 4 January, when a battalion of 150-mm. howitzers joined in the fight. In the early afternoon, an enemy column spearheaded by tanks of the 78th Tank Regiment broke through the 13th Infantry line along Route 7 and seized the northern portion of Guagua. Another column hit the 3d Battalion, 11th Infantry, to the left of the 13th, inflicting about 150 casualties. The two units held on long enough, however, for the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 11th Infantry to pull out. They then broke contact and followed the two battalions in good order. During this action Company A, 192d Tank Battalion, and elements of the 11th Division attempted to counterattack by striking the flank of the Japanese line before Guagua. This move almost ended in disaster. The infantry on the line mistook the tanks for enemy armor and began dropping mortar shells on Company A, and General Weaver, who was in a jeep attempting to coordinate the tank-infantry attack, was almost hit. The mistake was discovered in time and no serious damage was done. When news of the Japanese breakthrough at Guagua reached General Wainwright on the afternoon of the 4th he decided it was time to fall back again. The next line was to be south of the Gumain River, and orders were issued to the 11th, as well as the 21st Division, to withdraw to the new line that night. General Brougher's plan of withdrawal called for retirement along Route 7 through Guagua and Lubao to the new line. The rapid advance of the Tanaka Detachment through Guagua and down Route 7 toward Lubao late that afternoon, however, cut off this route of the retreat of the 11th Infantry and other elements of the line. A hasty reconnaissance of the area near the highway failed to disclose any secondary roads or trails suitable for an orderly retirement. To withdraw cross-country was to invite wholesale confusion and a possible route. The only course remaining to the cutoff units was to traverse a thirty-mile-long, circuitous route through San Jose, in the 21st Division sector, then down Route 74 to Dinalupihan. There the men would turn southeast as far as Layac Junction and then north along Route 7 to a point where they could form a line before the advancing Tanaka Detachment. That evening, 4 January, the long march began. Those elements of the 11th Division cut off by the Japanese advance, and Company A, 192d Tank Battalion, reached San Jose without interference from the enemy but not without adding to the confusion already existing in the 21st Division area. Meanwhile, at San Jose, General Brougher, the 11th Division commander, had collected all the trucks and buses he could find and sent them forward to carry his men. With this motor transportation, the 11th Infantry was able to take up a position along Route 7, at Santa Cruz, Lubao, by about 05:00 of the 5th of January.

By the dawn of 5 January, after two days of heavy and confused fighting, the Guagua-Porac line had been abandoned and the American and Filipino troops had pulled back to a new line south and west of the Gumain River. The 21st Division on the west had retired to a position about eight miles below Porac and was digging in along the bank of the river; to the east, the 11th Division had fallen back six miles and stood along a line about a mile south of the river. But the brief stand on the Guagua-Porac line had earned large dividends. The Japanese had paid dearly for the ground gained and had been prevented from reaching their objective, the gateway to Bataan. More important was the time gained by the troops already in Bataan to prepare their positions. The only troops remaining between the enemy and Bataan-the 11th and 21st Divisions, the 26th Cavalry, and the tank group-were now formed on their final line in front of the peninsula. This line, approximately eight miles in front of the access road to Bataan and generally along the Gumain River, blocked the approach to Bataan through Dinalupihan and Layac Junction. At Layac, Route 7 turns sharply northwest for 2,000 yards to Dinalupihan, the southern terminus of Route 74 along which the 21st Division was withdrawing. Route 7 then continues west across the base of the peninsula to Olongapo on Subic Bay, then north along the Zambales coast to Lingayen Gulf, a route of advance the Japanese had fortunately neglected in favor of the central plain which led most directly to their objective, Manila. In the 21st Division area to the west, there was much milling about and confusion on the 5th. Work on the Gumain River position progressed very slowly during the morning, and the troops showed little inclination to extend the line eastward to make contact with the 11th Division. The troops had hardly taken up their positions behind the Gumain River when General Wainwright issued orders for the withdrawal into Bataan through Layac Junction, to begin at dark. First to cross the bridge over the Culo River below Layac would be the 11th Division, followed closely by the 21st. To cover the withdrawal of the 11th, one battalion of the 21st Division was to sideslip over in front of the 11th Division, while the 26th Cavalry would protect the left flank of the 21st during its withdrawal. The 21st Division on the west had retired to a position about eight miles below Porac and was digging in along the bank of the river; to the east, the 11th Division had fallen back six miles and stood along a line about a mile south of the river. But the brief stand on the Guagua-Porac line had earned large dividends. The Japanese had paid dearly for the ground gained and had been prevented from reaching their objective, the gateway to Bataan. More important was the time gained by the troops already in Bataan to prepare their positions. When night fell the 11th Division withdrew from its positions and moved southwest along Route 7 toward Layac Junction and the road to Bataan. Soon the town was crowded with men and vehicles and as the withdrawal continued became a scene of "terrible congestion," of marching men, trucks, buses, artillery, tanks, horses, and large numbers of staff and command cars. "It looked," remarked one observer, "like the parking lot of the Yale Bowl."

At about 20:30 Col. John Moran, chief of staff of the 11th Division, reported that his division had cleared Layac and was across the Culo bridge. The 21st Division was now ordered across. My grandfather Teddy and his company were tired of marching with things such as Military types of equipment. The only source of energy was water, but my grandfather kept on marching despite the starvation. Observing the passage of men, Colonel O'Day wrote: " It was a painful and tragic sight--our soldiers trudging along, carrying inordinate loads of equipment and personal effects. Many had their loads slung on bamboo poles, a pole between two men. They had been marching almost since dark the night before, and much of the daylight hours had been spent in backing and filling. . . " By about midnight of the 5th, the last guns of the 21st Field Artillery had cleared the bridge, and within the next hour all of the foot troops, closely shepherded by the Scouts of the 26th Cavalry, were across. Last to cross were the tanks, which cleared the bridge shortly before 02:00 of the 6th. General Wainwright then ordered Capt. A.P. Chanco, commanding the 91st Engineer Battalion, to blow the bridge. The charges were immediately detonated and the span demolished. All of the troops were now on Bataan, and the last gate slammed shut. The Japanese had lost their opportunity again to cut off the retreat. Colonel Imai was still at Santa Cruz and Takahashi still hung back at Porac. The withdrawal into Bataan was now complete. At 04:00, they finally reached their destination. Under desperate circumstances and under constant pressure from the enemy, General MacArthur had brought his forces from the north and south to San Fernando and Calumpit. There, in a most difficult maneuver, he had joined the two forces and brought them safely into Bataan, fighting a delaying action all the way. All this had been accomplished in two weeks, during which time positions had been prepared on Bataan and supplies shipped there from Manila and elsewhere. Not a single major unit had been cut off or lost during the withdrawal, and only once, at Cabanatuan, had the American line failed to hold long enough to permit an orderly withdrawal. The success of this complicated and difficult movement, made with ill-equipped and inadequately trained Filipino troops, is a tribute to the generalship of MacArthur, Wainwright, and Jones and to American leadership on the field of battle. The withdrawal had been a costly one on both sides. General Wainwright's North Luzon Force of 28,000 men had been reduced to about 16,000 largely by the desertion of Filipino soldiers who returned to their homes. Only a small portion of the 12,000 men lost were battle casualties or captured by the enemy. General Jones' South Luzon Force fared much better. Of the 15,000 men in his force originally, General Jones had 14,000 left when he reached Bataan. The Japanese suffered close to 2,000 casualties during the period since the first landing. This number included 627 killed, 1,282 wounded, and 7 missing. The men who reached Bataan were tired and hungry. Before the fight began again they were accorded a brief rest while the enemy reorganized. To Colonel Collier, this interlude seemed but an intermission between the acts of a great tragedy entitled "Defense of the Philippines." But before the curtain could go up on the second act, certain off-stage arrangements had to be completed. While these did not directly affect the action on-stage, they exerted a powerful influence on the outcome of the drama.