The Battle of Bataan

The defense of Bataan began officially on 7 January 1942. On that day General Wainwright assumed command of the West Sector of the Bataan Defense Force, which became the I Philippine Corps, and the East Sector redesignated II Philippine Corps, came under General Parker, till then commander of the entire Bataan Defense Force. The boundary between the two corps bisected the length of the peninsula from Mt. Natib to the Mariveles Mountains. The tip of Bataan south of the Mariveles Mountains was designated the Service Command Area and responsibility for its defense given to Brig. Gen. Allen C. McBride, MacArthur's deputy for the Philippine Department. To Wainwright's corps was assigned the defense of the western half of Bataan; Parker's corps was on the Manila Bayside. Both corps were under MacArthur's headquarters on Corregidor, which by 5 January had established a Bataan echelon under Brig. Gen. R.J. Marshall. Through Marshall's headquarters, consisting of officers from the general and special staff sections of USAFFE, it was possible for MacArthur to exercise close control over operations on Bataan." I am on my main battle line," MacArthur told the War Department on 7 January, "awaiting the general attack." In Wainwright's corps on the west were three Philippine Army divisions, the 1st, 31st, and 91st, to which was attached the combat elements of the 71st Division (PA); the 26th Cavalry (PS); a battery each of field artillery and 75-mm. guns (SPM), and miscellaneous troops--altogether about 22,500 men. On the right (east), in Parker's corps, were four more Philippine Army divisions, the 11th, 21st, 41st, and 51st; supporting artillery; and the 57th Infantry (PS) from the Philippine Division. General Parker had about 25,000 men in his corps. Eight miles behind the main battle position, paralleling the Pilar-Bagac road, was the rear battle position which in prewar plans had formed the mainline of the Bataan defenses. On 7 January this line was not yet fully organized; while the forces along the main battle position held back the enemy, other troops would prepare this position. Posted along the line and assigned the task of organizing it for a last-ditch defense was the USAFFE reserve, the Philippine Division (less 57th Infantry), the tank group, and a group of 75-mm. SPMs. Corps and USAFFE artillery was emplaced to cover the front lines as well as the beach defenses in all sectors. The 57th Infantry, under the command of Col. George S. Clarke, was the first unit on the II Corps line to come under heavy infantry attack. Along the main line of resistance were the 1st Battalion on the right and the 3d Battalion on the left. The 2d Battalion was in reserve. Against I Corps on the western side of Bataan, General Nara sent his third regimental combat team, built around the 122d Infantry, and led by Col. Yunosuke Watanabe. Watanabe's mission was to advance west along Route 7 to Olongapo, then south to Morong. From there he would prepare to advance on Bagac, the western terminus of the one lateral road across Bataan. Nara apparently did not expect any resistance above Bagac and was not even certain that he would meet any there.

The Imperial high command has given General Masaharu Homma fifty days to conquer the Philippines, but he later realized that he could never totally invade the country if Bataan is still in the hands of the USAFFE. The Japanese opened the battle for Bataan at 15:00 on 9 January with a concentrated barrage directed against II Corps. As "the roar of artillery . . . shook the northern portion of the Bataan peninsula," the Japanese infantry moved out to the attack. By early afternoon, all troops were in position, tensely awaiting the zero hours. General Nara himself was at Dinalupihan. At 15:00 the big guns opened up. My grandfather used to hold his rosary tighter before the battle, he believes that it would save him from danger as his Mother said. The fighting began with heavy artilleries. The trembling noise of descending bombs and shells from the land and air could crack your eardrum. My grandfather Teddy and his comrade took the leaves of the Ampalaya plant which was scattered on the ground, this could make them invisible to the eyes of the enemies. They ran towards a foxhole, to cover and secure themselves from artillery shells, then they hurriedly placed the M1917 Browning Machine Gun on the ground and began firing the approaching Japanese troops. On the 11th day of January a reinforced company of the reserve battalion, which had established an outpost line south of the Calaguiman, came under attack by the advance elements of Colonel Imai's eastern column, the 2d Battalion, 141st Infantry. Soon the Japanese began to cross the Calaguiman, about one mile north of the mainline of resistance. By 23:00 the Japanese battalion had reached a cane field on the left front of the 57th's 3d Battalion, directly before Company I. This cane field, about 150 yards in front of the mainline of resistance, had not been cleared on the assumption that artillery would effectively prevent its use by the enemy as a route of approach. That night the Japanese in the cane field moved out against the main line of resistance. First came an artillery and mortar barrage, which was answered by concentrated fire from the 75-mm. guns of the 24th Field Artillery (PS). Hardly had the 24th opened fire than the Japanese infantry jumped off in a banzai attack across the moonlit patch of ground in front of Company I. Wave after wave of screaming Japanese troops hurled themselves forward in the face of intense fire. Men in the leading wave threw themselves on the barbed wire entanglements, forming human bridges over which succeeding waves could pass. Hundreds of Japanese troops died in the battle. The very ground of the battlefield became a burial ground surrounded by blood. On Corregidor, MacArthur and his staff" had been receiving full" and complete reports each day on the progress of the campaign from General Marshall and his assistants in the Bataan echelon of USAFFE. These reports had proved most disquieting, and on 22 January General Sutherland on MacArthur's orders went to Bataan himself to get "a clear picture of the situation." His first stop was Limay, near where General Parker had his headquarters. There he discussed the situation with the II Corps commander before moving on to visit General Wainwright. Actually, Sutherland's trip to I Corps was unnecessary for, after his talk with General Parker, he had decided that "withdrawal from the Abucay-Mt. Natib position was essential." He gave both corps commanders verbal warning orders to prepare for a general withdrawal to the reserve battle position behind the Pilar-Bagac road and told them they would receive written orders that night. The order for the withdrawal, issued on the night of 22 January, called for the progressive evacuation of the line, to be completed by daylight of the 26th. One of the officers who organized a group to block the Japanese offensive during the withdrawal was Lieutenant Ferdinand E. Marcos. The young Lieutenant led a group of one hundred stragglers, enabling the U.S. forces to carry out a withdrawal to a new defense line. The troops would start to withdraw under cover of darkness the following day, 23 January, and would continue the withdrawal on each succeeding night until all troops had reached the reserve battle position. The speed with which these detailed orders were issued indicates that they had already been prepared, an assumption which is entirely reasonable in view of the fact that the Abucay-Mauban line was never intended as the place where the troops would make their last stand. It had been occupied primarily to keep the Pilar-Bagac road in American possession as long as possible and to allow time to prepare the final line to the rear. That line extended generally along the Pilar-Bagac road, "a baked clay road with a double track," crossing it at various points to take advantage of favorable terrain.

During the night of 23-24 January, the artillery and service elements withdrew successfully, while all other units made hurried preparations to follow the next night. The covering force took its position during the day, with the tanks, scheduled to be the last to pull out, deployed along the East Road and the so-called Back Road southeast of Abucay Hacienda. The night of 24-25 January was one of confusion. On the extreme right of the line, troops of the 21st Division in the 57th Infantry sector began to fall back from positions above Abucay along the East Road. In the center of the line, the 41st Division withdrew along the Back Road. The withdrawal continued throughout the night of 24-25 January, all the next day and on through the night, with the Japanese in full pursuit. On the 25th Japanese aircraft were out in full force, bombing and strafing the retreating soldiers. From early morning until dusk, enemy planes buzzed unopposed over the long columns of men, dropping bombs and diving low to spray the road with machine-gun bullets. From their positions, my grandfather and his comrades began to fight back. He uses the Browning Machine Gun in this battle even he knew that he will be out of ammunition as the supply had not been distributed yet to their Division. His machine gun-fire continued until the last bullet, but the enemies were still aggressive with their charge. They were like ants passing elsewhere into the battlefield. He then dropped the Machine Gun and was forced to use his rifle, he used to think every piece of a bullet is important so he fired dozens of accurate gunshots to lessen the oppressors. I Corps fell back with little difficulty compare to the II Corps, the Division's Sector of my grandfather, which was withdrawing under heavy pressure. Cut off from the corps commander, Colonel Berry, it will be recalled, had independently decided to withdraw from the Mauban line. Wainwright, in the meantime, had received instructions from General Sutherland to evacuate the Mauban position and fall back behind the Pilar-Bagac road. As he was going forward, he met Colonel Berry who, by his decision, had anticipated Sutherland's order for a general withdrawal. Wainwright thereupon directed Berry to continue to withdraw but to take his men all the way back to the Pilar-Bagac road. By the morning of the 26th, I Corps was in position along the new line to the left of II Corps. Though they had finally been forced to give ground and abandon the first line of defense, the American and Filipino troops had inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. The 65th Brigade had entered combat on 9 January with a strength of 6,651 officers and men. By 24 January it had suffered 1,472 combat casualties, almost all of which were in the three infantry regiments. Attached units probably suffered proportionate losses and at the end of the Abucay fight, General Nara wrote that his brigade had "reached the extreme stages of exhaustion." When the troops of I and II Corps reached the reserve battle position, they were on the final line. Since 24 December, a month earlier, they had fallen back from position after position to reach the safety of Bataan. Here they had held off the overconfident enemy along a line which, because of the terrain in the center, was soon turned. After two weeks of hard fighting, the American and Filipino troops had fallen back again. There was no further retreat from the new line. "With its occupation," General Douglas MacArthur wrote to the Chief of Staff, "all manoeuvering possibilities will cease. I intend to fight it out to complete destruction." At 11:00, 27 January, Nara issued his own orders for the forthcoming attack. These were based on the 14th Army's erroneous assumption that the American positions in front of him constituted an outpost line and that the main objective was a line at Limay. Nara's plan was to make the main effort in the area held by Bluemel's men. The center of the attack was to be Capot, a small barrio near Trail 2 in front of the mainline of resistance. Making the attack would be two regiments, the 9th on the right (west) and the 141st on the left. They were to advance as far as the Pandan River where they would make ready for the assault against the supposed main line of resistance near Limay. The advance of these two regiments would be supported by Col. Masataro Yoshizawa's 142d Infantry (less 1st Battalion) on the brigade right, which was to drive southeast across the slopes of Mt. Samat to the Pandan River. Having reached the river, Yoshizawa was to shift the direction of his attack and advance down the river in a northeasterly direction to take the defenders in the rear. The regiment's initial advance would bring it to the American main line of resistance at the junction of Sectors C and D.

Sector C was under the command of Brig. Gen. Clifford Bluemel and consisted of his 31st Division (PA), fewer elements, and the remnants of the 51st Division (PA), soon to be organized into a regimental combat team. Together, these units held a front of about 4,500 yards. The remaining 6,000 yards of the II Corps line in front of Mt. Samat and extending to the Pantingan River constituted Brig. Gen. Maxon S. Lough's Sector D. Lough, commander of the Philippine Division, had under him the 21st including the group of my grandfather Teddy and 41st Divisions (PA) and the 57th Infantry (PS)-not yet in the line from his own division. Both Bluemel and Lough retained their division staff for the sector headquarters. A final and fifth sector, E, was added on 26 January when General Francisco's beach defense troops were incorporated into II Corps and made a part of Parker's command. In reserve, Parker kept the 1st Battalion, 33d Infantry (PA), from Bluemel's 31st Division, and a regiment of Philippine Army combat engineers. Along the high ground east of the mountain, in support of the other sectors, were the artillery components of the 21st, 31st, and 51st Divisions (PA), with an aggregate of forty 75-mm. guns, and two Scout battalions equipped with 75's and 2.95's. The Constabulary troops on beach defense, in addition to the support furnished by the 21st Field Artillery, were backed up by about a dozen naval guns. Corps artillery consisted of the 301st Field Artillery (PA) and the 86th Field Artillery Battalion (PS), whose 155-mm. guns (GPF) were emplaced in the vicinity of Limay. Sector D, 21st and 41st Divisions (PA) and the 33d Infantry (less 1st Battalion). In I Corps: Right Sector, 2d Philippine Constabulary and 11th Division (PA); Left Sector, elements of the 1st Division (PA) and the 91st Division. The reserve of the two corps remained unchanged but was backed up now by the Philippine Division in the USAFFE reserve. The American 31st Infantry was located just north of Limay on the east coast, from where it could support II Corps should the need arise. The 45th Infantry was in bivouac near the West Road, about three miles south of Bagac, in position to aid I Corps. The attack jumped off at 15:00, 27 January, with a feint by Maj. Tadaji Tanabe's 1st Battalion, 142d Infantry, down the East Road. Although the Japanese claimed to have met "fierce" fire from the Filipinos in this sector, the 31st Infantry (PA) was not even aware that an attack was being made. At 16:00 the rest of Colonel Yoshizawa's regiment attacked in the area between Sectors C and D, where the 51st Combat Team and 21st Division were posted. Without any difficulty, the regiment occupied the outpost line but was stopped cold at the main line of resistance. It was a sudden attack on the two Divisions that caused dozens of incapacitations and deaths of Bataan defenders. My grandfather was supplied enough ammunition from another Division for the Machine Gun and able to defend some of his comrades. Along the Pantingan river, he was in a prone position with bushes and overgrown grasses. While the fight was on, he could see some of the Soldiers were already losing hope. Two have been killed by grenade, some by gunshots, and others were impaled by the bayonet of charging Japanese troops in banzai attacks. He had to say his words with a louder voice, "Don't panic, brothers! We all die here if we won't fight back!". The Japanese opened the offensive against the I Corps on 26 January. Anxious to capitalize on his successful drive down the west coast, General Kimura sent his troops along the West Road against the 91st Division, on the extreme left of the line in the vicinity of Bagac. For two days, on the 26th and 27th, the Japanese sought to break through the new main line of resistance along the coast but the 91st held ground firmly. Repelled on the west, the Japanese, as they had done at Abucay, then began to probe the line in search of a soft spot. On the night of 28-29 January, they found one in the 1st Division area. The 1st Division had been badly disorganized and had lost much of its equipment in the first battle of Bataan and during the withdrawal along the beach. First sent to the rear for reorganization and a much-needed rest, the division had then been hurriedly sent to the front on 26 and 27 January to replace the 45th Infantry. Since then the men had worked frantically to make ready for an attack. They dug trenches and cleared fields of fire but the work progressed slowly. Lacking entrenching tools and axes, many of the men had been forced to dig holes with their mess kits and clear the underbrush with their bayonets.

The change in command of the West Sector occurred almost simultaneously with a reorganization of the command on Bataan following the withdrawal to the reserve battle position. On 25 January McBride was relieved of responsibility for beach defense and that mission was assigned by USAFFE to the two corps commanders. Francisco's command along the east coast was merged with Parker's corps, and the West Sector has redesignated the South Sector of Wainwright's corps on the west. Pierce, as commander of the South Sector, now came directly under Wainwright's command. Despite these administrative changes and the arrival of additional reinforcements- including the rest of the 21st Pursuit Squadron- the situation on Quinauan Point remained the same on the 25th and 26th. It was evident that trained infantry troops supported by artillery and tanks would be required to clear out the entrenched Japanese on both Quinauan and Longoskawayan Points. On the 26th USAFFE ordered the 2d Battalion, 88th Field Artillery (PS), which had withdrawn to I Corps from the Abucay line to the west coast to support the troops on beach defense. One battery of the Scout battalion's 75-mm. guns went to Longoskawayan Point; another battery, to Quinauan Point. The dispatch of trained infantry troops into the threatened area was hastened when, on 27 January, the Japanese attempted to reinforce their stranded men at Quinauan. MacArthur's headquarters quickly concluded that this move presaged a major enemy drive to cut the West Road and ordered Wainwright to clear the area as soon as possible. Wainwright thereupon ordered two Scout battalions, released from USAFFE reserve the day before, to move in and take over these sectors. The 2d Battalion, 57th Infantry, was to go to Longoskawayan Point; the 3d Battalion, 45th, to Quinauan Point. General Kimura's success against Wainwright's Mauban line between 20 and 23 January had led 14th Army headquarters to revise its estimate of the situation and to prepare new plans for the occupation of Bataan. Originally, the main effort had been made against II Corps on the east. In view of Kimura's success, General Homma now decided to place additional forces on the west and increase pressure against the I Corps in the hope that he might yet score a speedy victory. On the 25th, therefore, he directed Lt. Gen. Susumu Morioka, 16th Division commander, who had come up from southern Luzon and was now in Manila with a portion of his division, to proceed to western Bataan with two battalions of infantry and the headquarters of the 21st Independent Engineer Regiment and there assume command of the operations against I Corps. Homma's order of the 25th, though made two days after the landings at Longoskawayan and Quinauan, contained no reference to this effort to outflank I Corps by sea. Homma was not yet convinced that this amphibious venture should have the full support of the 14th Army. The decision to reinforce Tsunehiro's 2d Battalion at Quinauan, the only landing of which the Japanese had the knowledge, was made by General Morioka, Kimura's immediate superior. To him, as to Kimura, the landing held out the promise of large results. Even before he left Manila, he ordered one company of the small force at his disposal to go to the aid of the 2d Battalion, 20th Infantry. The company selected was from the same regiment's 1st Battalion. It was to move with all speed from Manila to Olongapo and there pick up supplies for the trapped and hungry men "fighting a heroic battle" against a "superior enemy" on Quinauan Point. About eighty of the enemy had made good their escape from the beachhead during the counterattack of the 12th. Hiding out in the daytime and traveling only at night, they made their way northward by easy stages. Four days later they were discovered about seven miles from Silaiim Point and only one mile from the I Corps main line of resistance. Their undetected four-day march through the congested area behind the I Corps can be attributed to the wildness of the country and to their skill in jungle warfare. Only the defensive barbed wire and cleared fields of fire along the front had prevented them from reaching their own lines. A squadron of the 26th Cavalry was sent from the corps reserve on the 16th to root them out. It took two days and the help of troops from the 72d and 92d Infantry to do the job. The three-week-long struggle to destroy the Japanese who had landed by accident at Anyasan and Silaiim Points was over. The cost on the American side was about 70 killed and 100 wounded. The 2d Battalion, 45th Infantry, which had been in action continuously since 29 January and had borne the brunt of the final counterattack, lost 68 men: 26 killed and 42 wounded. The 57th Infantry's 2d Battalion suffered fewer casualties; the remaining units even less.