The Last Stand of the Defenders

Since 6 January, when the ration had been cut in half, the 80,000 soldiers and 26,000 civilians on Bataan had received a steadily diminishing and unbalanced allowance of food. Theoretically, the half ration supplied the American soldier with 6 ounces each of flour and canned or fresh meat daily; the Filipino with 10 ounces of rice and 4 of meat or fish. In actual fact, the ration varied with time and circumstances, and never on Bataan did it equally a full half ration. From January through February, the daily issue averaged less than 30 ounces, as compared to the peacetime garrison ration of 71 ounces for Americans and 64 for Filipinos. From the start, it proved impossible to establish any theoretical basis for the issue of rations. The issue varied from day to day and was based not on the number of calories required or the vitamins necessary to maintain the health and efficiency of the command, but solely on the amount of food on hand. Since rice was most plentiful it became the basic element in the diet and all other foods were rationed to last as long as it did. While the situation on Bataan was never more favorable to the Allied cause than it was in mid-February, there was little hope in Washington that the Philippine garrison could withstand the Japanese assault for more than a few months. What would happen to General MacArthur then? Was he to be allowed to fall into Japanese hands or should he be saved for the Allied war effort still to come? The decision reached in Washington, presumably early in February, was that the general's services were too valuable to be sacrificed in a hopeless cause, that he must be rescued to lead other forces in the war against Japan. But there were difficulties in this solution. MacArthur would undoubtedly raise objections to any orders which might affect his reputation. And he might show an understandable reluctance to desert his troops in the midst of battle. Brig. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley, former Secretary of War and an old friend of MacArthur's, summarized these difficulties when he told General Wavell during a trip to the Indies that MacArthur would not leave the Philippines until "both the public and the troops were assured that command had passed to competent leadership." He explained also "that it would be necessary for the President to definitely order MacArthur to relinquish command and proceed elsewhere, and that even if such orders were issued MacArthur might feel that he had destroyed himself by leaving his beleaguered command." MacArthur's departure from the Philippines, Hurley concluded, would have to be arranged in such a way that "his honor and his record as a soldier" would not be compromised. The subject of MacArthur's evacuation from the Philippines and his future role in the war against Japan was first raised by the Chief of Staff in an oblique fashion on 2 February. The occasion was an inquiry about MacArthur's plans for his wife and young son who were on Corregidor with him. General Marshall followed up this inquiry two days later with the statement that "continuous consideration" was being given to the evacuation of officials from the Philippines. On 8 February, four days after Marshall's inquiry, the War Department received a message for President Roosevelt from Manuel Quezon. In this message, Quezon proposed that the United States immediately grant the Philippines their independence; that the Islands be neutralized; that American and Japanese forces be withdrawn by mutual consent; and that the Philippine Army be disbanded. Quezon's disquieting proposal was accompanied by a supporting message from General MacArthur, couched in the form of a military estimate of the situation. From this estimate, the War Department learned for the first time that the Philippine garrison had sustained a casualty rate of 50 percent and that divisions were reduced to the size of regiments and regiments to battalions. Although morale was good the men were "badly battle-worn" and "desperately in need of rest." "There is no denying the fact," MacArthur told Marshall, "that we are near done," and warned him to be prepared for "the complete destruction of this command" at any time. It was up to the United States to decide whether the time the Allies so badly needed could be attained better through Quezon's plan or by continuing the hopeless battle.

On 11 March 1942, under cover of night, MacArthur departed for Australia with his family and senior staff officers. When he arrived in Australia, he made his promise, "I shall return", and that was exactly what he does after two and a half years. He had to leave his troops, his army nurses, and American civilians to face the fury of the Japanese Army by the courageous resistance of the American and Philippine troops. When General MacArthur left the Philippines, General Wainwright was appointed to succeed MacArthur as General of the Armies of the Philippines while Major General Edward Postell King became the Commanding General of the Philippine-American forces on the Bataan Peninsula. After summarizing the attitude of the Filipinos as one of "almost violent resentment against the United States," MacArthur stated that, from the military point of view, "the problem presents itself as to whether the plan of President Quezon might offer the best possible solution of what is about to be a disastrous debacle." If the plan was accepted, he pointed out, "we lose no military advantage because we would still secure at least equal delay." The reaction from Washington was prompt and emphatic. On 9 February, one day later, President Roosevelt in a personal message to Quezon repudiated the scheme and declared that the United States Government would never agree to such a solution to the war in the Philippines. At the same time, he expressed his sympathy for Quezon and the Philippine people and pledged American support "whatever happens to the present American garrison." "So long as the flag of the United States flies on Filipino soil," Roosevelt assured Quezon, ". . . it will be defended by our own men to death ... we shall not relax our efforts until the forces which are now marshalling outside the Philippine Islands return to the Philippines and drive the last remnant of the invaders from your soil." To General MacArthur, Roosevelt sent a personal message authorizing the surrender of the Filipino troops if necessary, but forbidding the surrender of American troops, "so long as there remains any possibility of resistance." The President then went on to express his belief in the importance of the fight in the Philippines and the role of that garrison in the war against the Axis. Both Quezon and MacArthur accepted the President's decision without question. Quezon wrote that he fully appreciated the reasons upon which the decision was based and that he was "abiding by it." It was in his reply to the President's "no surrender" order that MacArthur answered Marshall's inquiry of a week earlier for his confidential views about evacuation. He and his family, MacArthur declared, had decided to remain in the Philippines and "share the fate of the garrison." He planned, he said, to fight "to destruction" on Bataan and then do the same of Corregidor. "I have not the slightest intention in the world," he told the President, "of surrendering or capitulating the Filipino element of my command. . . . There has never been the slightest wavering among the troops." MacArthur's message was penned on 15 February, the same day that the supposedly impregnable fortress at Singapore, the key to the British position in the Far East, surrendered. Already the Japanese had taken Malaya, Borneo, and the Celebes. The early loss of Sumatra and Java and the split of the ABDA area was virtually certain. Again MacArthur called for an attack against the Japanese line of communications, declaring with characteristic optimism that "the opportunities still exist for a complete reversal of the situation. On the 22nd of February, the President had directed MacArthur to leave the Philippines. His intention to do so had been made clear on the 21st when the Chief of Staff had told the Far East commander that the President was considering the advisability of ordering him to Mindanao to conduct the defense of the Philippines from there. President Roosevelt reluctantly ordered General Douglas MacArthur to abandon his hard-pressed army in the Philippines and assume the office of Supreme Commander, South West Pacific Area (SWPA) with headquarters in Australia. At the end of January General MacArthur had asked that naval forces, including the marines, be placed under his command "due to the restricted area of combat and the intimacy of liaison that is required." Army and Navy authorities in Washington quickly agreed to this request and on 30 January all naval forces in the Philippines had been put under MacArthur's control. Unity of command had thus been established for the first time in the campaign. Wainwright inherited this arrangement, with Capt. Kenneth M. Hoeffel as a naval commander.

The Japanese would advance in three columns. The right (west) column would consist of General Nara's 65th Brigade whose main force would march up the Pantingan River valley, along Trail 29, on the extreme left of the II Corps line. One element of the brigade was to remain west of the Pantingan River, in I Corps, to maintain contact with the 16th Division. Nara's objective was control of the area west of Mt. Samat. When he had gained this objective, he was to halt his troops, reorganize, and prepare to seize the commanding heights of the Mariveles Mountains. The 4th Division was to advance in two columns. On the right, next to the 65th Brigade and making the main effort, was Maj. Gen. Kureo Taniguchi's Right Wing, consisting of the 61st Infantry, one battalion of the 8th Infantry, the 7th Tank Regiment (less two companies), and artillery and service units. Taniguchi, the infantry group commander of the 4th Division, was to take his men across the Tiawir River and down along the Catmon River, in the center of Sector D, toward Mt. Samat. The 4th Division's Left Wing, organized around the 8th Infantry and led by Col. Haruji Morita, the regimental commander, was to form the easternmost column of the Japanese drive. It was to advance down Trail 4, against the Philippine Army's 21st Division on the right of Sector D, directly toward the first objective, Mt. Samat. During the second week of March, the month-long lull which had followed the Japanese withdrawal from the Orion-Bagac line came to an end. American and Philippine patrols now began to meet opposition from a counter-reconnaissance screen which Homma had thrown forward to mask preparations for the coming offensive. As the days passed Japanese patrols became more active, and troops along the outpost line reported skirmishes with the enemy who was already moving out to the line of departure. By the last week of March, the Japanese had pushed forward their screen to within 1,000 yards of the American line. There were other equally obvious signs after the middle of March that the Japanese would soon renew the attack. Observers reported that they were moving supplies and troops into Bataan and building roads. Enemy aircraft, rarely seen in the month following the Japanese withdrawal, now began to appear in increasingly large numbers, attacking front-line troops, artillery positions, and supply areas to the rear. At the grassy slope of Mt. Samat, the Allies would face the fury of the invaders. On the 25th of March, there was an enemy charge from the north and it would be a massive Japanese frontier. In this confrontation with a Browning Machine Gun against the Japanese troops, my grandfather got two gunshots from an enemy rifle, one on his right arm and another shot on his right leg above the knee. My grandfather still had the courage to fight back despite his wounded situation. Eventually, the battle has ended for a while and the combat medics then rescued my grandfather and brought him to the barracks for surgery. After the surgery, the nurse then handed the two bottles which contain the two pieces of 7.7×58mm Arisaka cartridge to my grandfather. On the following day, the bottles were delivered to the US Veteran's Hospital in Manila and he just claimed them after the war. When the wounds have been cured for three days, he insisted to go back again into the battle even his body was not fully recovered yet. Friday, 3 April, was not only the day General Homma had selected to open the offensive; it was also a religious and national holiday for the soldiers on both sides of the battle line. For the Christian defenders, it was the Friday of Holy Week, and the more devout observed the anniversary of the Crucifixion with prayers and fasting. For the Japanese, the 3d of April marked the anniversary of the death of the legendary Emperor Jimmu, the first ruler to sit on the imperial throne. In Japan there would be religious ceremonies and feasting; on Bataan, the soldiers of Hirohito, a direct descendant of the Emperor Jimmu, would celebrate the day in a more warlike manner. If all went well, they might gain victory in time to make the emperor's birthday, 29 April, a day of special rejoicing. On Good Friday the sun rose in a cloudless sky and gave promise of another hot, dry day so like those which had preceded it with endless monotony. From the top of Mt. Samat two American officers serving as artillery observers could plainly see the heavy Japanese guns, two to three miles behind the line, making ready to fire. Before their view was obscured they counted nineteen batteries of artillery and eight to ten mortar batteries. Observers to their east reported many more batteries of light artillery massed in close support of the infantry. At 09:00 this large array of guns, howitzers, and mortars, altogether almost 150 pieces, began to register on their targets. The Japanese began firing for effect at 10:00 and continued to fire with only one half-hour pause until 15:00, in what was undoubtedly the most devastating barrage of the campaign, equal in intensity, many thought, to those of the first World War. Simultaneously, the bombers of the 22d Air Brigade came out in force to add the weight of their bombs to the constant stream of shells falling upon the defenders huddled in their foxholes. In the 150 sorties flown that day, General Mikami's air force dropped more than sixty tons of bombs. Smaller aircraft swooped low over the front lines, strafing troops and vehicles at will, while far above them observation planes guided the bombers toward those batteries brave enough to reply to the Japanese barrage. "It was agonizing," wrote the commander of an antiaircraft battery, "to watch the heavies sail serenely over us, 1,000 yards beyond our maximum range. The effect of the air-artillery bombardment was devastating. So violent and continuous were the explosions, so thunderous the din that it seemed as though "all hell" had broken loose. Many of the defenses so carefully constructed during the weeks preceding the attack "were churned into a worthless and useless mess." Telephone lines and artillery positions were knocked out. The fire spread rapidly when the cane fields and bamboo thickets were set ablaze and the smoke and dust lay so thick over the battlefield that observers atop Mt. Samat were unable to direct fire. By 15:00 the artillery and aircraft had done their work. At that time the infantry and armor moved out to the attack. In the 21st Division area, General Capinpin had placed two of his regiments, the 22d, and 23d, east of the Catmon River, with the former holding the division right flank and tying in with Sector C to the right. The 21st Infantry on the division which is the regiment of my grandfather Teddy left flank held both banks of the Catmon as well as Trail 6, which cut diagonally across the regimental area from the right front to the left rear. General Lim's regiments were posted in order, with the 43d on the right, tying in with the 21st Infantry, the 42d in the center, and the 41st holding down the division and sector flank along the Pantingan. Across the river, on the extreme right of the I Corps line, was the 2d Philippine Constabulary. Against this front, the Japanese had massed the entire force committed to the assault, the 65th Brigade and the 4th Division both heavily reinforced. With the exception of one battalion west of the Pantingan, all of General Nara's reinforced brigade was concentrated before the 42d Infantry where Trail 29 joined the Pilar-Bagac road.

The Right Wing of the 4th Division, led by General Taniguchi and consisting of tanks, the 61st Infantry, a battalion of the 8th Infantry, plus supporting and service elements, had taken up a position north of the Tiawir, opposite the center of Sector D, and was poised to strike down Route 6 and the Catmon River valley. The division's Left Wing (8th Infantry), which was not scheduled to attack until the 5th, was farther to the east and north, facing the two right regiments of the 21st Division, the 21st, and 43d Infantry. The Japanese were scattered and approaching from the North when the regiment of my grandfather prepared themselves. There were Soldiers who've been suffering from illness. Despite the situation of some Soldiers, they still had to face the enemy. The collision between the Japanese and Filipino troops began approximately at 16:30. The group of my grandfather Teddy counter-attacked the enemy charge from the South of the river at first, they crawled up on the rocky and grassy terrain then fired dozens of gunshots. He had to aim his machine gun fire at the Japanese troops who committed consecutive banzai attacks, while the others were aiming their fire at the enemies on the ground with wild plants on their bodies who've been hiding for an ambush tactic. The 21st Division had suffered heavily from the day's bombardment, but only its westernmost element, the left battalion of the two-battalion 21st Infantry, had broken which includes the group of my grandfather, Teddy. Posted in front of the Pilar-Bagac road, on the west bank of the Catmon River, this battalion stood in the path of Taniguchi's powerful Right Wing, and when the enemy tanks appeared the Filipinos, "shattered by incessant shelling and bombing, weak from dysentery, malaria, and malnutrition," fled to the rear. The right battalion of the regiment, however, held firm. Hurriedly organizing the scattered elements of the left battalion, the regimental commander, Lt. Col. William A. Wappenstein, was able by nightfall to re-establish his line with a refused left flank along the east bank of the Catmon. News of the route of the 41st Division and the disintegration of the corps left flank reached General Parker, the corps commander, late in the afternoon of Good Friday. The danger was immediate and compelling and he quickly released the only unit he had in reserve, the 33d Infantry (PA), less the 1st Battalion, to General Lough, commander of Sector D. The regiment, led by Maj. Stanley Holmes, moved out at dusk, under orders to establish a defensive position across Trail 6 between Mt. Samat and the Catmon River by the morning of the 4th. Those some troops from the 21st Infantry along the river were eventually moved back to Mt. Samat to reinforce another regiment. The group of my grandfather had to face the battle of Mt. Samat for the second time. He had to use his rifle and pistol for this battle. He used to think there were Japanese who've been hiding elsewhere throughout the Grassy and Rocky Mountain, therefore they must be all sharpened their eyes and be alert of the aggressive Japanese troops. The condition on the top of the Mountain was dangerous and warm. There were wild animals, insects, and plants that they had to dodge and keep away from. They used to sprint and crawl to avoid being detected as there were enemy Infantries hiding, artilleries, and tanks which continues on firing. My grandfather had always kept on reminding himself that "If I were not aware of Japanese attacks, I'd just die like a beatable Soldier". My grandfather Teddy had no doubt that the heavenly god was guiding him from the Battles he fought from Pangasinan to Bataan. At the time Filipinos manifest their Patriotism. They always think the Motherland must be defended to the death. They used to say from the bottom of their hearts that "To die for your country is really an honor."