The Surrender

From the 1st day of April 1942, the casualties of the combined Filipino-American forces had begun to increase day by day. Some were killed in action, by diseases such as Malaria as they were in the jungle of Mt. Samat, and some died of starvation. After almost four months of fighting into the Bataan peninsula, my grandfather Teddy's health began to decline as they had no more supply of food from the US. The lack of supplies from the US such as ammunition and food caused a serious problem for the defenders. The vessels that would supply the US territories in the Pacific were destroyed by the Japanese when they bombed Pearl Harbor. And the lack of supplies from the US could soon bring the Japanese Empire to its victory in the battle of Bataan. At the young age of twenty-two, my grandfather learned how to survive on his own even in the darkest hour. When the North Luzon Force was deployed on the Bataan Peninsula, the Soldiers began to eat wild fruits, and animals in the jungle and drink a palm of water from the river in order to survive. One of the Divisions of Bataan Defenders, the 26th Cavalry regiment was also suffering from starvation. But even though they were starving, none of the cavalrymen ate their horses. The Bataan defenders knew that they could wipe out the entire Japanese forces in Bataan as they were combinations of USAFFE North and South Luzon forces, but at the same time, they also knew that they can no longer fight back as they were out of ammunition and they were already dying in starvation. At dawn, 5 April, the Japanese resumed their devastating air and artillery bombardment. It was Easter Sunday and many of the Americans and Filipinos were attending dawn services "in the fastness of the jungle" when the shells and bombs began to fall. For them, the day of the Resurrection was not the joyous occasion it had been in peacetime. The services, wrote one officer, had "a serious atmosphere for us," and chaplains, invoking divine guidance, did not fail to ask as well for "deliverance from the power of the enemy." The attack began at 10:00 when both columns of the 4th Division moved out. The strengthened Left Wing, making the main attack against the right flank of the 21st Division, soon ran into unexpectedly stubborn resistance. The Filipinos, supported by two battalions of the 41st Field Artillery on the south slope of Mt. Samat and by artillery from the adjoining sectors, put up so stiff a fight that one Japanese officer described it as "the fiercest combat in the second Bataan campaign." Against this determined opposition, Taniguchi's men made little headway and by early afternoon were still pinned down on Trail 4, far short of their objective. The Right-Wing under Colonel Sato had meanwhile been pushing ahead unopposed on the exposed left flank of the 21st Division, up the northwest slopes of Mt. Samat. Near the summit, it met a single platoon of the 21st Infantry which it easily routed and at 12:50 secured possession of the mountaintop. The position of the 41st Field Artillery, whose fire was so effectively pinning down General Taniguchi's Left Wing on Trail 4, was now untenable, and the artillerymen were forced to evacuate. Before they did, they destroyed their equipment and rolled their guns over the cliffs. No longer pinned down by the artillery General Taniguchi promptly resumed the offensive. At 14:00 he sent one of his battalions across the northeast slopes of the mountain in a flanking movement while increasing pressure on the defenders to his front. In this battle of the 21st Infantry, the Browning Machine Gun of my grandfather was useless as there was no more supply of ammunition. He was getting tired and starving, but despite the difficulty, he still had to use his last loaded Springfield rifle and M1911 pistol to defend himself. He got wounds from his legs as they used to crawl upwards and downwards into the slope of the Rocky Mountains to ambush and counter-attack the aggressive Japanese troops.

On the 4th, before the reinforcing units had reached their designated assembly areas, Parker released to General Lough the 31st Infantry, the 45th Infantry (less the 1st Battalion), and one company of tanks. With these troops and those already in his sector, Lough was to launch a counterattack on the morning of the 6th to regain first the reserve line and finally the main line of resistance. At 16:00 of the 4th, the 45th Infantry began its march east toward II Corps. By dawn the next morning it had crossed the Pantingan and reached Trail Junction 8-29. The 31st Infantry and Company C, 194th Tank Battalion, began their march north along Trail 2 toward the battle area at 20:00 of the 4th. They found the road almost completely blocked by retreating Filipinos and took three hours to reach the San Vicente River, where, at an abandoned bivouac area, the 31st Infantry halted for the night. The tankers presumably camped nearby and the next day marched west to join the 4th Infantry. Easter Sunday was a hectic day at Sector D headquarters. Between frantic phone calls to and from units in front of the advancing Japanese, the staff prepared its plan for the counterattack. This plan, completed late on the afternoon of the 5th, provided for a coordinated drive, starting at 06:00 on the 6th, north on the three trails in Sector D toward the reserve line. On the right, east of Mt. Samat, the 31st Infantry would attack north on Trail 4. The remnants of the 21st Division, the extent of whose disastrous route that afternoon was still not fully known at Sector D headquarters, would advance up the slopes of Mt. Samat. The 33d Infantry, in position at the zigzag on Trail 6, was to advance along that trail, between the Catmon River and the western slopes of Mt. Samat. The remnants of the 42d and 43d Infantry, about four hundred men, were to push north from Trail Junction 6-8 along Trail 6 behind the 33d Infantry. While this action was in progress, the main body of Taniguchi's Left Wing was attacking the remnants of the 21st Division on Trail 4. Encircled and isolated, the Filipinos sought desperately to break through the Japanese ring and make their way back to safety. Most were killed or captured, but some escaped. Of these, a small number reached the American lines. The news they brought of the disintegration of the 21st Division and the strength of the Japanese on Trail 4 was disquieting. On the basis of these reports, Colonel Brady concluded that his regiment of about 800 men, most of them in poor condition, was faced by a much stronger force than had been thought. Even if he could launch a successful counterattack he doubted that he could hold any gains made with the few men he had. He, therefore, halted his men until he had presented his conclusions to General Lough. Unable to reach Sector D headquarters by telephone, he sent Lt. Col. Peter D. Calyer, his operations officer, together with some of the 21st Division men, in a jeep to General Lough's command post to present these new facts and to get further instructions. Before the day was over it was already evident that his carefully planned counterattack was a failure. On the east, the 31st Infantry had not even been able to reach the line of departure. The 21st Division, routed on the night of 5-6 April, made no effort to carry out its part of the plan to restore the line. In the center, the 42d and 43d had again been routed and the 33d Infantry surrounded. Only on the west, along Trail 29 had the Americans met with any success that day. But the victory was a hollow one, for the 41st Infantry was still cut off and the Japanese were threatening a move that would isolate the 45th from the rest of the troops in Sector D. The disorganized but hard-fighting 21st Division troops, deprived of their artillery support, were in no condition to stand against the powerful Left-Wing alone and shortly before 15:30 began to fall back. Only scattered elements along Trail 4 barred Taniguchi's way south and he and his men easily pushed toward the line of the Tala River, below Mt. Samat. That same afternoon Sato's Right-Wing made its way unopposed down the southern slopes of Mt. Samat. At 16:30 advance elements of this force reached the command post of the 21st Division near the junction of Trails 4 and 429. Taken by surprise, officers and men of the headquarters took flight, the majority moving west along Trail 429 to set up a new command post a mile away, at the junction of that trail and Trail 6. General Capinpin, the division commander, was not among those who reached safety; he had become separated from his staff during the disorganized flight and been captured by the Japanese. The mission of the 31st Infantry in the counterattack of the 6th was to advance north on Trail 4, east of Mt. Samat, to the reserve line of the 21st Division. The regiment, in position at the intersection of the San Vicente River and Trail 2 when it received its orders, was to move to Trail Junction 4-429, the designated jump-off point, sometime during the evening of the 5th and move out from there at 06:00 the next morning. Almost immediately this plan miscarried. Late on the afternoon of the 5th General Taniguchi's powerful Left Wing, advancing south on Trail 4 had routed the 21st Division elements along the trail and Colonel Sato's Right-Wing had hit the division command post on Trail Junction 4-429. When informed of these events, sector headquarters changed the 31st Infantry's jump-off point to Trail Junction 44-429, about 1,300 yards east of the original starting positions.

The regiment now would have to recapture Trail Junction 4-429 before it could even begin its counterattack along Trail 4. When news of the Japanese attack first reached General King on 3 April he ordered the 31st Infantry to move under cover of darkness to "a position of readiness" near the junction of Trails 10 and 2. From there it could move north on Trail 2 or west on Trail 10 to almost any point along the front. At the same time, King ordered the Provisional Tank Group (less two companies) to move to the direct support of Parker's imperiled corps. There was nothing more that General King could do that day. Parker had already released his reserve to the Sector D commander and every effort was being made to reform the shattered 41st Division and to establish a line in front of the advancing Japanese. When, on the morning of 4 April, the 21st Division fell back from the main line of resistance, General King took prompt measures to avert the threatened disaster in II Corps. He gave to Parker, who already had the support of the Provisional Tank Group, the American 31st Infantry, possibly the most carefully hoarded unit of the Philippine campaign, and ordered the battle-tested 45th Infantry (PS), less the 1st Battalion, east across the Pantingan to the junction of Trails 29 and 8 in the II Corps area. The 57th Infantry King retained in force reserve but ordered it to move forward that night to the bivouac area vacated by the 31st Infantry. With the rapidly advancing Japanese forces to the northern and southern parts of the Philippines, President Quezon was advised by General Douglas MacArthur to establish a "government exile" to the United States, Quezon invited Chief Justice Abad Santos to leave with him. The latter declined to remain in the Philippines and carry on his work and stay with his family. On March 17, 1942, the day of Quezon's departure from Negros Oriental, for the US by way of Australia, he appointed Jose Abad Santos as the Acting President with full authority to act in the name of, and on behalf of the President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and become the Acting-Commander in Chief of the Armed forces of the Philippines in some areas unoccupied by the Japanese. When the Japanese invaded the Philippines, President Quezon retreated to Corregidor, "the Rock", with MacArthur, and demanded the United States military aid that never came. He would grow bitter toward the United States as his country was overrun by Japanese troops (though he never truly lost respect for the US), one time shouting publicly after listening to one of Roosevelt's fireside chats: "come, listen to this scoundrel! Que demonio!(demon) How typical of America to writhe in anguish at the fate of a distant cousin, Europe, while a daughter, the Philippines, is being raped in the back room!". Seeing no aid from Washington, Quezon contemplated pleading for the Commonwealth's independence, thinking that he would be able to declare neutrality and see to the exit of the military of both Japan and the United States, declaring the Philippines "the Switzerland of the Far East". He was convinced by MacArthur that Japan would not respect such independence, and withdrew that notion, if only for a short while. On 8 Feb, he could no longer tolerate the lack of aid from the United States. He sent Roosevelt, via US War Department channels, this message: "after nine weeks of fighting not even a small amount of aid has reached us from the United States. Help and assistance have been sent to other belligerent nations,... but seemingly no attempt has been made to transport anything here... The United States has practically doomed the Philippines to almost total extinction to secure a breathing space." President Roosevelt, perhaps as expected, denied Quezon's request for independence. When, late in the evening of 8 April, General Wainwright ordered a counterattack by I Corps in the direction of Olongapo, General King had already reached the conclusion that he had no alternative but to surrender. By that time all chance of halting the Japanese advance, much less launching a successful counterattack, was gone. The last of his reserves, as well as those of the two corps, had been committed. On the left, I Corps was still intact but was in the process of withdrawal in an effort to tie in its right flank with the rapidly crumbling II Corps. General Parker's corps on the right had completely disintegrated and no longer existed as a fighting force. Efforts to hold at the Alangan River had failed and General Bluemel had reported soon after dark that his small force of 1,300 Scouts and Americans was in retreat. General Wainwright was well aware of the disintegration of the Luzon Force. His messages to Marshall and MacArthur on the 8th gave a clear picture of impending doom. Late that night he had told MacArthur, "with deep regret," that the troops on Bataan were "fast folding up," and that the men were so weak from malnutrition "that they have no power of resistance." MacArthur, in turn, had alerted Washington to the danger. "In view of my intimate knowledge of the situation there," he warned the Chief of Staff, "I regard the situation as extremely critical and feel you should anticipate the possibility of disaster there very shortly." By the time this warning reached Washington silence had fallen on Bataan. If the situation appeared critical to those on Corregidor and in Australia, how much blacker was the future to General King on whom rested the responsibility for the fate of the 78,000 men on Bataan. As early as the afternoon of 7 April, when the last of the Luzon Force and I Corps reserves had been committed without appreciably delaying the enemy, he had realized that his position was critical. It was then that he sent his chief of staff, General Funk to Corregidor to inform Wainwright that the fall of Bataan was imminent and that he might have to surrender.

At just what point in the last hectic days of the battle of Bataan General King made his decision is not clear. He may already have decided to surrender on the 7th when he sent Funk to Corregidor, for even at that time it was evident that defeat was inevitable. The next day, sometime during the afternoon, King instructed his senior commanders to make preparations for the destruction of all weapons and equipment, except motor vehicles and gasoline, but to wait for further orders before starting the actual destruction. At the same time he told General Wainwright that if he expected to move any troops from Bataan to Corregidor, he would have to do it that night "as it would be too late thereafter." When Colonels Constant Irwin and Carpenter came to Bataan to discuss the withdrawal of the 45th Infantry (PS) with the Luzon Force staff they "gained the impression" after a conversation with King that he felt the decision to surrender "might be forced upon" him. The inability of General Bluemel's force to hold the line at the Alangan River on the 8th must have been the deciding factor in General King's decision to surrender. He learned of Bluemel's predicament after dark when General Parker reported that the Alangan River position had been turned from the west and that all units were withdrawing. As a last desperate measure, he ordered Colonel Sage's antiaircraft brigade to establish a line south of the Cabcaben airfield. By 23:00 it was evident that it would be impossible to reinforce the last thin line, which was still forming, and that there was nothing to prevent the enemy from reaching the congested area to the south. It was at this time that General King held "a weight, never to be forgotten conference," with his chief of staff and his operations officer. At this meeting, General King reviewed the tactical situation very carefully with his two staff officers and considered all possible lines of action. Always the three men came back to the same problem: would the Japanese be able to reach the high ground north of Mariveles, from which they could dominate the southern tip of Bataan as well as Corregidor, as rapidly if the Luzon Force opposed them as they would if their advance was unopposed. The three men finally agreed that the Japanese would reach Mariveles by the evening of the next day, 9 April, no matter what course was followed. With no relief in sight and with no possible chance to delay the enemy, General King then decided to open negotiations with the Japanese for the conclusion of hostilities on Bataan. He made this decision entirely on his own responsibility and with the full knowledge that he was acting contrary to orders. The "ignominious decision," he explained, was entirely his and he did not wish anyone else to be "saddled with any part of the responsibility." "I have not communicated with General Wainwright," he declared, "because I do not want him to be compelled to assume any part of the responsibility." Further resistance, he felt, would only be an unnecessary and useless waste of life. "Already our hospital, which is filled to capacity and directly in the line of hostile approach, is within range of enemy light artillery. We have no further means of organized resistance." Though the decision to surrender could not have surprised the staff, it "hit with an awful bang and a terrible wallop." Everyone had hoped for a happier ending to the grim tragedy of Bataan, and when General King walked out of the meeting "there was not a dry eye present." On Corregidor General Wainwright spent the night in ignorance of these events. At 03:00 he spoke to King on the telephone but King did not mention his decision to surrender. It was only three hours later, at 06:00, that General Wainwright learned from his assistant operations officer, Lt. Col. Jesse T. Traywick, Jr., that General King had sent an officer to the Japanese to arrange terms for the cessation of hostilities. Shocked, he shouted to Traywick, "Go back and tell him not to do it." But it was too late. Williams and Hurt were already on their way to meet Nagano and General King could not be reached by telephone or radio. Regretfully General Wainwright wrote to MacArthur: "At 6 o'clock this morning General King . . . without my knowledge or approval sent a flag of truce to the Japanese commander. The minute I heard of it I disapproved of his action and directed that there would be no surrender. I was informed it was too late to make any change, that the action had already been taken. . . . Physical exhaustion and sickness due to a long period of insufficient food is the real cause of this terrible disaster. When I get word what terms have been arranged I will advise you." General Nagano, who spoke no English, opened the meeting by explaining through an interpreter that he was not authorized to make any arrangements himself but that he had notified General Homma an American officer who was seeking a meeting to discuss terms for the cessation of hostilities. A representative from 14th Army headquarters, he told King, would arrive very soon. A few minutes later a shiny Cadillac drew up at the building before which the envoys were waiting and Colonel Nakayama, the 14th Army senior operations officer, emerged, accompanied by an interpreter. General King rose to greet him, but Nakayama ignored him and took a seat at the head of the table. King resumed his seat at the opposite end, erect with his hands forward in front of him. "I never saw him look more like a soldier," wrote his aide, "than in this hour of defeat."